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I. Introduction
In November 2013, Alexander Lora received word that the
police were looking for him.1 On a Friday morning, a week before
Thanksgiving, Lora stood outside his girlfriend’s apartment in
Brooklyn waiting for the officers to arrive.2 Lora assumed it was a
simple misunderstanding and was eager to clear things up, as he
was starting a new job in the construction industry the following
day.3 Instead, Lora stood in awe as five vehicles quickly pulled up
the street and a group of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) officers came storming towards him.4 According to Lora, the
officers threw him against a car, handcuffed him, and told him
“[y]ou’re going to get deported.”5
Lora was born in the Dominican Republic, but he entered the
United States as a lawful permanent resident (LPR) in 1990
when he was seven years old.6 Since arriving to the United
States, Lora “lived continuously in Brooklyn, New York where he
1. Batya Ungar-Sargon, Heavy Burdens and Unfair Fights in Immigration
Courts, CITY LIMITS (Dec. 17, 2015), http://citylimits.org/2015/12/17/heavyburdens-and-unfair-fights-in-immigration-courts/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2017) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. Keegan Hamilton, Here Legally, Detained for Months, VICE NEWS (Nov.
29,
2016),
https://news.vice.com/story/jennings-rodriguez-supreme-courtimmigrant-detention-alexander-lora (last visited Sept. 1, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Ungar-Sargon, supra note 1.
3. Ungar-Sargon, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 606 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Lora entered
the United States as a lawful permanent resident (‘LPR’) from the Dominican
Republic in 1990 when he was seven years old.”).
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has a large family network, including his . . . chronically ill U.S.
citizen mother, LPR father, and U.S. citizen brother and sister.”7
At the time of his 2013 detention, Lora “was 31 and staying with
his girlfriend in Brooklyn; they took turns caring for Lora’s son
with the two-year-old’s mother, Lora’s ex.”8
Lora’s 2013 detention stemmed from a 2009 arrest, where
Lora and a co-worker were charged with allegedly selling
cocaine.9 In 2010, Lora pleaded guilty to criminal possession of
cocaine and was sentenced to five years’ probation.10 Lora “was
not sentenced to any period of incarceration and he did not
violate any of the conditions of his probation.”11
Unbeknownst to Lora, the possession charge rendered him
deportable12 under both 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)13 and 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).14 Further, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)15 requires
detention16 during removal proceedings for non-citizens17 eligible
7. Id.
8. Ungar-Sargon, supra note 1.
9. See Hamilton, supra note 2 (“The deportation was triggered by a 2009
case in which Lora was arrested for allegedly selling cocaine from the Brooklyn
bodega where he worked.”).
10. See id. (“He pleaded guilty to a possession charge and was sentenced to
probation, not realizing, he says, that it would be considered a deportable
offense under immigration law.”).
11. Lora, 804 F.3d at 606.
12. See id. at 607
Lora was charged with removability under INA § 237(a)(2)(B), 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B), for having been convicted of a crime involving
a controlled substance, and INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), for having been convicted of an aggravated felony,
namely, trafficking in a controlled substance as defined in INA
§ 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B).
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (2012).
14. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
15. Id. § 1226(c).
16. Section 1226(c)(2) provides one narrow exception to mandatory
detention for the purpose of witness protection. See infra note 70 for the
complete text of § 1226(c)(2).
17. When possible, this Note will use the term “non-citizen” as opposed to
the statutory term “alien” used by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). See, e.g., D. McNair
Nichols, Jr., Note, Guns and Alienage: Correcting a Dangerous Contradiction, 73
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2089, 2092 n.19 (2016) (“It seems prudent during academic
discussion to avoid using the term ‘illegal alien,’ which has potentially
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for deportation under § 1227(a)(2)(B) or § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).18
Accordingly, the ICE officers who detained Lora in November of
2013 were acting pursuant to § 1226(c).
At the time of his 2013 detention, Lora was gainfully
employed,19 he had extensive family ties to Brooklyn,20 he shared
custody of his two-year-old child,21 and he had never been
arrested for a violent crime.22 Unfortunately for Lora, none of
these facts mattered, as § 1226(c) denied Lora the opportunity for
a bond hearing to demonstrate that he was not a flight risk and
posed no threat to the community.23 Instead, Lora was
transferred to Hudson County Correctional Center (Hudson) and
detained without bond pending removal proceedings.24
Pursuant to § 1226(c), Lora sat in detention at Hudson with
no opportunity for bail and no idea how long he would remain
there.25 Finally, after five and a half months at Hudson, Lora
received a bond hearing26 after successfully contesting a
pejorative and inflammatory implications.”); Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection
of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by the National Government, 1977 SUP.
CT. REV. 275, 303 (“The very word, ‘alien,’ calls to mind someone strange and out
of place, and it has often been used in a distinctly pejorative way.”).
18. See Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 607 (2d Cir. 2015) (“DHS took the
position that Lora’s removal charges rendered him subject to mandatory
detention under section 1226(c) and that he was not eligible for a bail hearing.”).
19. See Ungar-Sargon, supra note 1 (“He was starting a new job the next
day that he was excited about, in construction.”).
20. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (describing Lora’s family ties
to Brooklyn).
21. See Ungar-Sargon, supra note 1 (“At the time, Lora . . . took turns
caring for Lora’s son with the two-year-old’s mother, Lora’s ex.”).
22. See Lora, 804 F.3d at 616 (“[H]e has no arrest record aside from this
non-violent drug offense conviction . . . .”).
23. See M. Isabel Medina, Demore v. Kim—A Dance of Power and Human
Rights, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 697, 700 (2004) (“Thus, the statute on its face
required detention of permanent resident aliens without a hearing and
eliminated the possibility of bail in the case of a person who did not pose a flight
risk and was not a danger to the community.”).
24. See Lora, 804 F.3d at 607 (“After the agents took Lora into custody, he
was transferred to Hudson County Correctional Center in Kearny, New Jersey,
where he was detained without bond.”).
25. See Ungar-Sargon, supra note 1 (“Alex Lora became an immigrant
detainee with no trial date and no stated term limit.”).
26. See Scott Martelle, Judges Should Decide Which Deportation Cases
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procedural flaw in his 2013 detention.27 At the hearing, an
immigration judge ordered Lora’s release on bond after the
parties stipulated that Lora “was not dangerous and posed no
risk of flight.”28
Despite Lora’s ultimate release from custody, the five and a
half months in detention drastically impacted the lives of him
and his family. Speaking on the aftermath of his detention, Lora
told Vice News that “[i]t stresses me out, every day of my life
since I was there.”29 While detained at Hudson, Lora lost his
construction job.30 Even worse, Lora was alerted at Hudson that
“the mother of his son attempted suicide, causing the child to be
placed temporarily in foster care.”31
Since his release, Lora has regained custody of his son, but
he still faces potential deportation.32 When asked about the
prospect of deportation to the Dominican Republic, a place Lora
has not lived since he was seven years old, Lora replied “[w]hat
am I going to do there? I’m not a stranger here, but I’m a stranger
there.”33
Lora’s deportation case is scheduled for 2018,34 and if not for
a technicality, he would still be in detention while his case is
Require
Detention,
L.A.
TIMES
(Nov.
6,
2015,
10:08
AM),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-immigration-court-detentions20151106-story.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2017) (“Lora eventually won a bond
hearing and was released on $5,000 bail five and a half months after he was
detained.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
27. See Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 605 (2d Cir. 2015)
He contended . . . that he was eligible to apply for bail because the mandatory
detention provision of section 1226(c) did not apply to him because he had not
been taken into custody ‘when released’ and that indefinite incarceration
without an opportunity to apply for bail violated his right to due process.
28. Id.
29. Hamilton, supra note 2.
30. Martelle, supra note 26.
31. Hamilton, supra note 2.
32. See id. (“Lora has regained custody of his son, but he’s still fighting to
stop his deportation.”).
33. Id.
34. Liz Robbins, Court Sets Limit on Holding Immigrants in Some
Deportation
Cases,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
30,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/31/nyregion/court-sets-limit-on-holdingimmigrants-in-criminal-cases.html?_r=0 (last visited Sept. 1, 2017) (on file with
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pending.35 Therefore, Lora is fortunate that his detention lasted
only five and a half months,36 but the question remains, why lock
Lora up at all? His entire life was turned upside down over a
crime for which he was already charged and sentenced three
years prior.
The United States detained approximately 441,000
non-citizens like Lora in 2013.37 As Lora’s story demonstrates,
thousands of non-citizens languish in detention awaiting
deportation determinations pursuant to § 1226(c).38 Additionally,
§ 1226(c) provides no limit to the amount of time an arrestee can
be held pending removal proceedings.39 Accordingly, § 1226(c)
requires indeterminate detention of non-citizens in Lora’s
predicament, with no individualized determination as to whether
detention is actually warranted.40
Further, because detention under § 1226(c) continues until
the conclusion of deportation proceedings, individuals like Lora
“with strong ties to the United States, who have both the legal
grounds and every incentive to contest their deportation . . . are

the Washington and Lee Law Review).
35. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing Lora’s successful
challenge of a procedural flaw in his 2003 detention).
36. For instance, in Ly v. Hansen, “[t]he INS took Ly into custody on May
11, 1999 and kept him in detention for 500 days before a district court ordered
his release.” 351 F.3d 263, 265 (6th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added).
37. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
ANNUAL REPORT: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2013, at 1 (2014),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Enforcement_Actions_2013.p
df.
38. See infra notes 44–48 and accompanying text (discussing the
immigration detention system in the United States).
39. See Medina, supra note 23, at 700 (“The statutory provisions
concerning removal and mandatory detention do not specify the period of time
in which removal must be determined nor do they provide a specific limit to the
period of time within which an alien placed in removal proceedings must be
detained.”).
40. See Farrin R. Anello, Due Process and Temporal Limits on Mandatory
Immigration Detention, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 363, 365 (2013) (“Because immigration
judges and the Department of Homeland Security (‘DHS’) view the mandatory
detention law as stripping them of discretion to determine whether detention is
warranted in an individual case and to set an appropriate bond, mandatory
detention bears little relation to the goals of immigration enforcement.”).
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detained the longest under the statute.”41 This quandary causes
many detainees “to give up on viable claims” and accept
deportation
simply
to
escape
continued
detention.42
Consequently, mandatory, indeterminate detention under
§ 1226(c) disincentivizes some detainees from challenging their
deportation.43
As to how all of this impacts United States citizens,
mandatory detention under § 1226(c) is part of an enormously
costly immigration detention system.44 In 2013, ICE held
approximately 34,000 non-citizens like Lora in detention per
day.45 As of 2013, the daily cost of immigration detention was
about $164 per person.46 Therefore, in 2013, the federal
government spent upwards of $5 million taxpayer dollars per day
on immigration detention.47 Accordingly, ICE’s 2013 annual
budget for immigration detention alone was approximately $2
billion.48
In Demore v. Kim,49 the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of § 1226(c) against Hyung Joon Kim’s claim
41. Margaret H. Taylor, Demore v. Kim: Judicial Deference to
Congressional Folly, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 343, 361 (David A. Martin & Peter
H. Schuck eds., 2005).
42. Id. at 362.
43. See Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right To
Appointed Counsel For Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal
Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63, 82 (2012) (“As such, the prospect of
prolonged mandatory detention coerces some detainees to give up their rights
and accept deportation to escape detention.”).
44. See infra notes 45–48 and accompanying text (describing the costs
associated with immigration detention in the United States).
45. Immigration Detention: How Can the Government Cut Costs?, HUMAN
RIGHTS
FIRST
1
(2013),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/uploads/pdfs/immigration-detention-fact-sheetjan-2013.pdf.
46. Id.
47. Id. (emphasis added).
48. Id.
49. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 530 (2003). In Demore, the Court
considered the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which authorized the
detention of certain criminal non-citizens during removal proceedings. Id. at
514. Respondent, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was
convicted of first-degree burglary in 1996. Id. at 513. In 1997, respondent was
convicted of a second crime, “petty theft with priors.” Id. The Immigration and
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that “his detention under § 1226(c) violated due process because
the INS had made no determination that he posed either a
danger to society or a flight risk.”50 In the wake of the Demore
decision, the federal circuit courts continue to wrestle with how
§ 1226(c) can co-exist with the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.51 The result has been the emergence of a circuit split,52
with both sides acknowledging that a statute authorizing
mandatory, indeterminate detention poses a constitutional
problem.53 Each circuit has since interpreted § 1226(c) to contain
an implicit “limit on the amount of time that an individual can be
detained without a bail hearing.”54 However, the circuits remain
divided as to what limit to apply.55
Naturalization Service (INS) “charged respondent with being deportable from
the United States in light of these convictions, and detained him pending his
removal hearing.” Id. Respondent did not dispute the validity of his prior
convictions. Id. Further, respondent did not dispute that he was “subject to
mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).” Id. at 513–14. Rather,
respondent challenged the constitutionality of § 1226(c) itself. Id. at 514.
Respondent argued that “his detention under § 1226(c) violated due process
because the INS had made no determination that he posed either a danger to
society or a flight risk.” Id. In evaluating the constitutionality of § 1226(c), the
Court explained that § 1226(c) “serves the purpose of preventing deportable
criminal aliens from fleeing prior to or during their removal proceedings, thus
increasing the chance that, if ordered removed, the aliens will be successfully
removed.” Id. at 528. The Court stated that “[s]ome studies presented to
Congress suggested that detention of criminal aliens during their removal
proceedings might be the best way to ensure their successful removal from this
country.” Id. at 521. The Court went on to assert that “Congress may make rules
as to aliens that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” Id. at 522.
Finally, the Court noted the temporary nature of detentions under § 1226(c). Id.
at 530. For these reasons, the Court concluded that “[d]etention during removal
proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of the process.” Id. at 531.
Therefore, the Court upheld the constitutionality of § 1226(c).
50. Id. at 514. See infra Part IV.C for further analysis of Demore.
51. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that “[n]o person shall
be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”
(emphasis added)).
52. See infra Part V for further discussion of the federal circuit split.
53. See Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486, 494 (1st Cir. 2016) (“And, each
circuit has found it necessary to read an implicit reasonableness requirement
into the statute itself, generally based on the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance.”).
54. Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 614 (2d Cir. 2015).
55. See id. at 614 (“[W]hile all circuits agree that section 1226(c) includes
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The Second56 and Ninth57 Circuits read a six-month
limitation into the statute, at which point detention becomes
presumptively unreasonable.58 In contrast, the First,59 Third,60
and Sixth61 Circuits opt for individualized reviews to determine
whether detention has become unreasonable.62
This Note proceeds as follows: Part II lays out the
background and intended purpose of § 1226(c).63 Part III delves
into the origin of Congress’s plenary power over immigration
regulation.64 Part IV discusses the evolution of Congress’s
plenary power in the detention context.65 Part V discusses the
current circuit split regarding interpretation and application of
§ 1226(c).66 Part VI posits that non-citizens within the United
States receive the same due process rights as citizens.67
some ‘reasonable’ limit on the amount of time that an individual can be detained
without a bail hearing, courts remain divided on how to determine
reasonableness.”).
56. See id. at 616 (“[W]e hold that, in order to avoid the constitutional
concerns raised by indefinite detention, an immigrant detained pursuant to
section 1226(c) must be afforded a bail hearing before an immigration judge
within six months of his or her detention.”).
57. See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013)
(“Therefore, subclass members who have been detained under § 1226(c) for six
months are entitled to a bond hearing . . . .”).
58. See infra Part V.B for further analysis of the Second and Ninth
Circuits’ interpretations of § 1226(c).
59. See Reid, 819 F.3d at 501 (“Our ruling today, requiring an
individualized approach, removes that predicate.” (emphasis added)).
60. See Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 232–33 (3d Cir. 2011)
(“At a certain point, continued detention becomes unreasonable . . . . This will
necessarily be a fact-dependent inquiry that will vary depending on individual
circumstances. We decline to establish a universal point at which detention
always be considered unreasonable.”).
61. See Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 274 (6th Cir. 2003) (“We hold that the
INS may detain prima facie removable criminal aliens, without bond, for a
reasonable period of time . . . . The reasonableness of the length of detention is
subject to review by federal courts in habeas proceedings . . . .”).
62. See infra Part V.A for further analysis of the First, Third, and Sixth
Circuits’ interpretations of § 1226(c).
63. Infra Part II.
64. Infra Part III.
65. Infra Part IV.
66. Infra Part V.
67. Infra Part VI.
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Accordingly, this Note argues that § 1226(c), as applied by the
Demore Court and the federal circuit courts, fails to provided
non-citizen detainees with adequate due process.
II. Examining 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)
A. Background and Impact of § 1226(c)
In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform
and
Immigrant
Responsibility
Act
(IIRIRA),68 “which
substantially altered many provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act.”69 Pursuant to the IIRIRA, Congress enacted 8
U.S.C. § 1226(c),70 which requires detention of certain criminal
68. Pub. L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009–546 (1996).
69. Clay McCaslin, Comment, “My Jailor is My Judge”: Kestutis Zadvydas
and the Indefinite Imprisonment of Permanent Resident Aliens by the INS, 75
TUL. L. REV. 193, 196 (2000).
70. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012)
(c) Detention of criminal aliens
(1) Custody
The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who—
(A) is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered
in section 1182(a)(2) of this title,
(B) is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered
in section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title,
(C) is deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title on the
basis of an offense for which the alien has been sentence [1] to a term
of imprisonment of at least 1 year, or
(D) is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or
deportable under section 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title,
when the alien is released, without regard to whether the alien is
released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and without
regard to whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again for
the same offense.
(2) Release
The Attorney General may release an alien described in paragraph
(1) only if the Attorney General decides pursuant to section 3521 of
title 18 that release of the alien from custody is necessary to provide
protection to a witness, a potential witness, a person cooperating with
an investigation into major criminal activity, or an immediate family
member or close associate of a witness, potential witness, or person
cooperating with such an investigation, and the alien satisfies the
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non-citizens71 during removal proceedings.72 Additionally,
§ 1226(c) does not provide arrestees with a bond hearing.73
Further, “[t]he statutory provisions concerning removal and
mandatory detention do not specify the period of time in which
removal must be determined nor do they provide a specific limit
to the period of time within which an alien placed in removal
proceedings must be detained.”74 Accordingly, § 1226(c) requires
detention of non-citizens for the duration of removal proceedings,
regardless of how long those proceedings take.75

Attorney General that the alien will not pose a danger to the safety of
other persons or of property and is likely to appear for any scheduled
proceeding. A decision relating to such release shall take place in
accordance with a procedure that considers the severity of the offense
committed by the alien.
71. See Deborah F. Buckman, Validity, Construction, and Application of
Mandatory Predeportation Detention Provision of Immigration and Nationality
Act (8 U.S.C.A. § 1226(c)) as Amended, 187 A.L.R. FED. 325 § 2[a] (2003)
[I]n addition to the “aggravated felon” category of offenses, the
AEDPA expanded the application of the mandatory detention
provision in 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226(c) to include also less dangerous
offenses such as crimes of moral turpitude with a sentence of one year
in prison, harboring of aliens, theft offenses with a term of
imprisonment of one year or more, fraud, tax evasion, assisting
document fraud in some cases, and perjury. The range of crimes,
which are covered by 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226(c)’s mandatory detention
provisions, is therefore very wide (§ 8).
72. See Anello, supra note 40, at 363 (“Since 1996, the Immigration and
Nationality Act has required the government to take into custody individuals in
removal proceedings who have past convictions for any of a wide range of
criminal offenses.”); see also Medina, supra note 23, at 699–700 (“One of the
most problematic changes was the statute at issue in Demore v. Kim, which
again mandated detention of all permanent resident aliens placed in removal
proceedings because of a criminal conviction or because they have engaged in
terrorist activities.”).
73. See Travis Silva, Note, Toward a Constitutionalized Theory of
Immigration Detention, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 227, 254 (2012) (“Section 1226(c)
does not entitle the noncitizen to any process weighing the traditional bail
factors, including his risk of flight and ties to the community.”).
74. Medina, supra note 23, at 700.
75. See id. (“Thus, the statute on its face required detention of permanent
resident aliens without a hearing and eliminated the possibility of bail in the
case of a person who did not pose a flight risk and was not a danger to the
community.”).
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B. Legislative History of § 1226(c)

A 1995 Senate Report76 from the Committee of Governmental
Affairs provides insight into the circumstances surrounding the
passage of § 1226(c).77 The Committee described the state of
immigration law at the time of enactment in dire terms.78
To the issue of deportation, the Committee asserted that
“[d]espite previous efforts in Congress to require detention of
criminal aliens while deportation hearings are pending, many
who should be detained are released on bond.”79 Consequently,
the Committee stated that “[o]ver 20 percent of nondetained
criminal aliens fail to appear for deportation proceedings.”80
Further, the Committee noted that “[u]ndetained criminal aliens
with deportation orders . . . receiv[e] a final notification from the
INS that requires them to voluntarily report for removal.”81
Predictably, some non-citizens fail to voluntarily report for their
own deportation.82 In an effort to remedy this issue, the
Committee suggested that the Immigration and Naturalization

76. See infra Part IV.C for further discussion of the Demore Court’s use and
analysis of the Senate Report.
77. See S. REP. NO. 104-48, at 1 (1995)
America’s immigration system is in disarray and criminal aliens
(non-U.S. citizens residing in the U.S. who commit serious crimes for
which they may be deportable) constitute a particularly vexing part of
the problem . . . . Criminal aliens are a serious and growing threat to
public safety that costs our criminal justice systems hundreds of
millions of dollars annually.
For additional analysis of the legislative history and purpose of § 1226(c), see
Gerard Savaresse, Note, When Is When?: 8 U.S.C. § 1226(C) and the
Requirements of Mandatory Detention, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 285, 299 (2013).
78. See S. REP. NO. 104-48, at 1 (“[T]he deportation system is in such
disarray that no one, including the Commissioner of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, can even say with certainty how many criminal aliens
are currently subject to the jurisdiction of our criminal justice system.”).
79. Id. at 2.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 24 (“This notice is often referred to by INS officials as the ‘run
notice’ since, as one would expect, criminal aliens who have received written
notices to report for deportation often fail to appear for their actual
deportation.”).
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Service (INS) should detain more non-citizens during removal
proceedings.83
III. Chinese Exclusion Cases and the Origin of the
Plenary Power Doctrine
At the heart of this Note lies the underlying question of
whether a statute authorizing mandatory, indeterminate
detention without a bond hearing violates the due process rights
of non-citizens.84 In upholding the constitutionality of § 1226(c),
the Demore Court partially relied on Congress’s plenary power85
to regulate immigration.86 The Court first articulated the plenary
power doctrine in the so-called Chinese Exclusion Cases.87
A. Historical Backdrop to the Chinese Exclusion Cases

83. See id. at 4 (“Problems of undetained criminal aliens who fail to appear
or who abscond after they are ordered deported would be lessened if the INS
detained more criminal aliens.”).
84. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that “[n]o person shall
be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”
(emphasis added)).
85. See Gabriel J. Chin, Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting: The Origins
of Plenary Power, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 7, 7 (David A. Martin & Peter H.
Schuck eds., 2005) (“Anxiety over Asian immigration . . . spawned a pair of late
nineteenth century Supreme Court cases establishing the principle that
Congress possesses plenary power to regulate discrimination . . . . The message
from these cases . . . is that where the status of immigrants is concerned, almost
anything goes.”).
86. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (“In the exercise of its
broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes
rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” (quoting Mathews v.
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80 (1976))). See infra Part IV.C for further discussion of
the Court’s Demore decision.
87. See Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion
Cases: The “Plenary Power” Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights,
10 ASIAN L.J. 13, 14 (2003) (“The plenary power doctrine was first articulated in
the immigration context in the Chinese exclusion cases.”); see also DAVID A.
MARTIN & PETER H. SCHUCK, IMMIGRATION STORIES 2 (2005) (“Chae Chan Ping v.
United States . . . and Fong Yue Ting v. United States . . . are regarded as the
foundation stones for the plenary power doctrine.”).
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In 1868, the United States and China entered into the
Burlingame Treaty,88 which recognized “the inherent and
inalienable right of a man to change his home and allegiance.”89
Under the Treaty, “[t]ravelers from one country to the other were
entitled to ‘the same privileges, immunities, and exemptions in
respect to travel or residence, as may there be enjoyed by the
citizens or subjects of the most favored nation.’”90 Accordingly, the
Treaty ushered in an era of Chinese immigration to the United
States,91 particularly to partake in the so-called California gold
rush.92
However, there was a backlash on the West Coast to this
influx of Chinese immigration,93 for many of the same reasons
some Americans denounce immigration today.94 In response to
the immense backlash, Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion
88. See Chin, supra note 85, at 8 (“This immigration was specifically
authorized by the Burlingame Treaty, concluded between China and the United
States in 1868.”).
89. Burlingame Treaty, U.S.-P.R.C., July 28, 1868, 16 Stat. 739; Chin,
supra note 85, at 8.
90. Chin, supra note 85, at 8 (quoting 16 Stat. 739, 740 (July 28, 1868)).
91. See id. (“Between 1870 and 1880, 138,941 Chinese migrated to the
United States . . . .”).
92. See id. at 7–8 (“Chinese came to the country they called ‘Gold
Mountain’ to participate in the California gold rush, and their numbers grew
slowly.”).
93. See id. at 8 (“By the mid-1870s, however, California and other western
states demanded restriction of Chinese immigration . . . .”); see also Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 595–96 (1889) (discussing the factors that
led to a demand for restriction of Chinese immigration).
94. Justice Field’s summary of the backlash to Chinese immigration in
1889 echoes many of the same assertions made in modern times. Justice Field
spoke of contention regarding employment opportunities, a lack of assimilation,
and a fear of the minority one day becoming the majority. See Chae Chan Ping,
130 U.S. at 594–95
[T]hey began to engage in various mechanical pursuits and trades,
and thus came in competition with our artisans and mechanics, as
well as our laborers in the field . . . . It seemed impossible for them to
assimilate with our people . . . As they grew in numbers each year
the people of the coast saw, or believed they saw . . . great danger
that at no distant day that portion of our country would be overrun by
them . . . .
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Act95 in 1882, which “suspended immigration of Chinese laborers
for ten years.”96 In 1884, a subsequent Act mandated that any
Chinese immigrants wishing to temporarily leave the United
States must obtain certificates for re-entry.97 However, as seen in
Chae Chan Ping v. United States,98 Congress later declared such
certificates null and void.99
B. Chae Chan Ping v. United States
Chae Chan Ping immigrated to the United States in 1875.100
In 1887, Ping obtained a re-entry certificate and departed for a
return visit to China.101 While Ping was abroad, Congress passed
the Scott Act102 in response to continued backlash against
Chinese immigration.103 The Scott Act prohibited the entry or reentry of all Chinese laborers, including those holding re-entry
certificates.104 In 1888, Ping returned to the United States,

95. Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882).
96. Chin, supra note 85, at 8.
97. See Saito, supra note 87, at 15 (“In 1884 Congress required all Chinese
residents who wanted to leave the United States temporarily to obtain
certificates of re-entry.”).
98. 130 U.S. 581 (1889). See infra Part III.B for a discussion of the Chae
Chan Ping decision.
99. See Chin, supra note 85, at 11 (“As for the return certificates, the
statute provided that no more could be issued, and that ‘every certificate
heretofore issued . . . is hereby declared void and of no effect, and the chinese
laborer claiming admission by virtue thereof shall not be permitted to enter the
United States.” (quoting Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1064 § 2, 25 Stat. 504)).
100. See id. (“Chae Chan Ping had come to the United States in 1875 . . . .”).
101. See id. (stating that Ping lived in the United States “until June 2, 1887,
when he returned for a visit to China after first having obtained a re-entry
certificate”).
102. Scott Act, ch. 1064, § 1, 25 Stat. 504 (1888).
103. See Chin, supra note 85, at 11 (describing the factors that influenced
Congress’s decision to pass the Scott Act).
104. See Saito, supra note 87, at 15 (“In 1888, a few days before his return, a
new law went into effect precluding the entry of all Chinese workers, regardless
of whether they held certificates.”); Chin, supra note 85, at 11 (“Perhaps 30,000
Chinese, residents of the United States but temporarily overseas, held re-entry
certificates that were now void.”).

2352

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2337 (2017)

arriving via the steamship Belgic to a port in San Francisco.105 At
the port, Ping presented his certificate for re-entry into the
United States.106 The collector at the port, acting pursuant to the
Scott Act, refused to accept Ping’s certificate.107 Subsequently, the
captain of the Belgic detained Ping on board the ship because
Ping’s re-entry certificate “had been declared void while he was at
sea.”108
On a writ of habeas corpus, the Circuit Court, Northern
District of California heard Ping’s petition for release from
unlawful custody.109 The Circuit Court ruled that Ping was not
entitled to enter the United States and ordered that Ping remain
in custody on board the ship.110 On appeal to the Supreme Court,
Ping argued that the Scott Act violated his right to re-enter and
work in the United States.111 Ping asserted that the Burlingame
Treaty and the statutes passed to execute it vested such rights to
Chinese laborers.112
In evaluating Ping’s claim, the Court recognized that the
Scott Act violated the spirit of the Burlingame Treaty and the
statutes passed to execute it.113 However, the Court stated that
when a treaty and statute both fall within the purview of
Congress, the last in time rule applies.114
105. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582 (“On the 7th of September, 1888,
the appellant, on his return to California, sailed from Hong Kong in the
steam-ship Belgic, which arrived within the port of San Francisco on the 8th of
October following.”).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Chin, supra note 85, at 11.
109. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 582 (1889).
110. Id.
111. See id. at 589 (“The validity of the act is assailed as being in effect an
expulsion from the country of Chinese laborers, in violation of existing treaties
between the United States and the government of China, and of rights vested in
them under the laws of congress.”).
112. Id.
113. See id. at 600 (“It must be conceded that the act of 1888 is in
contravention of express stipulations of the treaty of 1868, and of the
supplemental treaty of 1880 . . . .”).
114. See id.
If the treaty operates by its own force, and relates to a subject within
the power of congress, it can be deemed in that particular only the
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More consequential for this discussion, the Court
“characterized Ping’s certificate as a license . . . . [which] may
typically be revoked at any time.”115 Therefore, the Court
classified those rights vested to immigrants under treaties and
statutes as contractual in nature and subject to the will of
Congress.116 In essence, the Court’s ruling granted Congress the
ability to limit or revoke such rights at will.117
The Court’s Chae Chan Ping opinion laid the foundation for
Congress’s plenary power over immigration regulation.118 Writing
for the Court, Justice Field did not cite to any provisions in the
Constitution granting Congress with such authority over
immigration.119 Rather, Justice Field viewed Congress’s power
over immigration as inherent to protect the sovereignty and
security of the country.120 Justice Field asserted that a foreign
sovereign could invade the United States through a
state-sanctioned invasion or through “vast hordes of its people
crowding in upon us.”121 Consequently, Justice Field stated that
equivalent of a legislative act, to be repealed or modified at the
pleasure of congress. In either case the last expression of the
sovereign will must control.
115. Rose Cuison Villazor, Chae Chan Ping v. United States: Immigration as
Property, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 137, 150 (2015).
116. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 600 (“A treaty, it is true, is in its
nature a contract between nations, and is often merely promissory in its
character, requiring legislation to carry its stipulations into effect. Such
legislation will be open to future repeal or amendment.”).
117. See, e.g., id. at 609 (“Whatever license, therefore, Chinese laborers may
have obtained, previous to the act of October 1, 1888, to return to the United
States after their departure, is held at the will of the government, revocable at
any time, at its [p]leasure.”); Silva, supra note 73, at 232 (“In other words,
though the country may have entered into a binding commitment under
international law, Congress’s decision to subsequently exclude the entry of
Chinese immigrants was absolute and judicially unreviewable.”).
118. See Chin, supra note 85, at 13 (“The innovative ground of the Supreme
Court’s decision, which had not been focused on in the circuit court, was the
breadth of federal power over immigration.”).
119. See id. at 13–14 (“The Court recognized this authority not from any
particular provision of the Constitution, but as inherent in sovereignty . . . .”).
120. See id. at 14 (“The Court’s understanding of the scope of the power may
have been influenced by the circumstances under which it was exercised. It
regarded the exclusion of the Chinese as almost a war measure . . . .”).
121. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889).
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Congress possessed “sovereign powers delegated by the
constitution”122 to counter either type of foreign encroachment.123
Further, Justice Field concluded that Congressional actions that
deter either type of encroachment would be “conclusive upon the
judiciary.”124 Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Circuit Court’s
ruling against Ping.125 Over one hundred years later, “Chae Chan
Ping remains good law today and continues to support the federal
government’s . . . power to regulate and enforce immigration
law.”126
C. Fong Yue Ting v. United States
On May 5, 1892, one day before the Chinese Exclusion Act
was set to expire, President Harrison signed into law the Geary
Act,127 which was “[a]n act to prohibit the coming of Chinese
persons into the United States.”128 Among other provisions, the
122. See id. at 609 (“The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of
sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States as a part of those
sovereign powers delegated by the constitution, cannot be granted away or
restrained on behalf of any one.”).
123. See id. at 606
The government, possessing the powers which are to be exercised for
protection and security, is clothed with authority to determine the
occasion on which the powers shall be called forth; and its
determinations, so far as the subjects affected are concerned, are
necessarily conclusive upon all its departments and officers. If,
therefore, the government of the United States, through its legislative
department, considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in
this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its
peace and security, their exclusion is not to be stayed because at the
time there are no actual hostilities with the nation of which the
foreigners are subjects.
124. See id. (“The existence of war would render the necessity of the
proceeding only more obvious and pressing. The same necessity . . . may arise
when war does not exist . . . . In both cases its determination is conclusive upon
the judiciary.”).
125. Id. at 611.
126. Villazor, supra note 115, at 138.
127. Geary Act, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25 (1892).
128. See Chin, supra note 85, at 16 (“On May 5, 1892, one day before the
original act would have lapsed, President Harrison signed into law the Geary
Act, a new and yet sterner measure. The Act was entitled ‘An Act to prohibit the
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Act provided that all Chinese laborers in the United States must
obtain a certificate of residence within one year of the Act’s
passage.129 Under the Act, any Chinese laborer “found within the
jurisdiction of the United States without such certificate of
residence, shall be deemed and adjudged to be unlawfully within
the United States.”130 Pursuant to the Act, Chinese laborers
found without a certificate of residence were “brought to a U.S.
judge, who would order deportation.”131
In Fong Yue Ting v. United States,132 the Court granted three
writs of habeas corpus “upon petitions of Chinese laborers
arrested and held by the marshal of the district for not having
certificates of residence.”133 The issue before the Court was
whether Congress’s “sovereign powers delegated by the
constitution”134 extended beyond “the exclusion of those first
arriving to the deportation of permanent residents.”135 The Court
ruled in the affirmative,136 further solidifying Congress’s plenary
power to regulate immigration.137
coming of Chinese persons into the United States’ . . . .”).
129. See Geary Act § 6 (“And it shall be the duty of all Chinese laborers
within the limits of the United States . . . to apply to the collector of internal
revenue of their respective districts, within no year after the passage of this act,
for a certificate of residence . . . .”).
130. Chin, supra note 85, at 17 (quoting Geary Act § 6).
131. Id.
132. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
133. Id. at 699.
134. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
135. Saito, supra note 87, at 16.
136. See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 707 (“The right of a nation to expel or
deport foreigners who have not been naturalized, or taken any steps towards
becoming citizens of the country, rests upon the same grounds, and is as
absolute and unqualified, as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance
into the country.”).
137. See id. at 731
The question whether, and upon what conditions, these aliens shall
be permitted to remain within the United States being one to be
determined by the political departments of the government, the
judicial department cannot properly express an opinion upon the
wisdom, the policy, or the justice of the measures enacted by congress
in the exercise of the powers confided to it by the constitution over
this subject.
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However, unlike the unanimous Chae Chan Ping decision,138
the Fong Yue Ting majority faced substantial opposition.139 Most
notable was Justice Field’s dissent, considering he wrote the
majority opinion in Chae Chan Ping.140 In his dissenting opinion,
Justice Field observed a fundamental distinction between the
rights of non-citizens first arriving to the United States and
non-citizens already in the country.141 Justice Field believed that
non-citizens within the United States should receive the same
constitutional rights and protections as citizens.142 Accordingly,
Justice Field objected to the Majority extending his Chae Chan
Ping decision to limit the rights of non-citizens residing in the
United States.143
138. See supra Part III.B (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Chae
Chan Ping).
139. See Chin, supra note 85, at 19 (“Unlike Chae Chan Ping, there was
substantial opposition to the majority’s view.”).
140. See supra notes 118–126 and accompanying text (discussing Justice
Field’s majority opinion in Chae Chan Ping).
141. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 746 (1893) (Field, J.,
dissenting) (“[B]etween legislation for the exclusion of Chinese persons, that is,
to prevent them from entering the country, and legislation for the deportation of
those who have acquired a residence in the country under a treaty with China,
there is a wide and essential difference.”).
142. See id. at 754
Aliens from countries at peace with us, domiciled within our country
by its consent, are entitled to all the guaranties for the protection of
their persons and property which are secured to native-born citizens.
The moment any human being from a country at peace with us comes
within the jurisdiction of the United States . . . he becomes subject to
all their laws, is amenable to their punishment, and entitled to their
protection . . . . To hold that they are subject to any different law, or
are less protected in any particular, than other persons, is, in my
judgment, to ignore the teachings of our history, the practice of our
government, and the language of our constitution.
143. See id. 149 U.S. at 760
The decision of the court, and the sanction it would give to legislation
depriving resident aliens of the guaranties of the constitution, fill me
with apprehensions. Those guaranties are of priceless value to every
one resident in the country, whether citizen or alien. I cannot but
regard the decision as a blow against constitutional liberty, when it
declares that congress has the right to disregard the guaranties of the
constitution intended for the protection of all men domiciled in the
country with the consent of the government, in their rights of person
and property.
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IV. Evolution of Congress’s Plenary Power in the
Detention Context
The Supreme Court continued to uphold Congress’s plenary
power throughout the twentieth century. However, the Court
began to draw a distinction between the due process rights of
non-citizens first arriving to the United States and those already
in the country.144 The following cases track the evolution of
Congress’s plenary power as applied to the detention of
non-citizens.
A. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei
Ignatz Mezei lived in the United States from 1923 to 1948.145
In May of 1948, Mezei “sailed to Europe, apparently to visit his
dying mother in Rumania.”146 Mezei attempted to return to the
United States in February of 1950.147 However, upon arrival in
New York, Mezei found himself temporarily excluded from the
United States pursuant to the Passport Act.148 Immigration
authorities directed Mezei to Ellis Island to await further
disposition of his case.149 The Attorney General, acting pursuant
to the Passport Act, ordered Mezei’s “temporary exclusion to be
144. See infra note 329 and accompanying text (providing extensive
Supreme Court precedent delineating the due process rights of non-citizens).
145. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 208 (1953).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See id. (“Upon arrival on February 9, 1950, he was temporarily
excluded from the United States by an immigration inspector acting pursuant to
the Passport Act as amended and regulations thereunder.”); see also id. at 210–
11
Under [the Passport Act], the Attorney General, acting for the
President, may shut out aliens whose ‘entry would be prejudicial to
the interest of the United States’. And he may exclude without a
hearing when the exclusion is based on confidential information the
disclosure of which may be prejudicial to the public interest. (quoting
Section 1 of the Act of May 22, 1918, c. 81, 40 Stat. 559, as amended
by the Act of June 21, 1941, c. 210, s 1, 55 Stat. 252, 22 U.S.C. s 223,
22 U.S.C.A. s 223).
149. See id. at 208 (“Pending disposition of his case he was received at Ellis
Island.”).
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made permanent without a hearing before a board of special
inquiry, on the basis of information of a confidential nature, the
disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the public interest.”150
In 1951, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York sustained Mezei’s writ of habeas corpus and
reviewed the Attorney General’s order.151 At this time, Mezei had
been detained without a hearing for twenty-one months.152 The
District Judge requested that the Government provide evidence
of the threat to public safety justifying Mezei’s continued
detention.153 When the Government refused to provide such
information, the District Judge ruled for Mezei’s “conditional
parole on bond.”154 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the District Judge’s ruling.155 In 1953, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari and considered whether “the Attorney
General’s continued exclusion of respondent without a hearing
amounts to an unlawful detention.”156
In examining Mezei’s predicament, the Supreme Court saw
the issue as one of exclusion rather than detention.157 In its
opinion, the Court referenced Chae Chan Ping158 and Congress’s
non-justiciable plenary power to exclude non-citizens from
entering the United States.159 Accordingly, the Court upheld the
150. Id. (emphasis added).
151. Id. at 209.
152. Id.
153. See id. (“The District Judge, vexed by the problem of ‘an alien who has
no place to go’, did not question the validity of the exclusion order but deemed
further ‘detention’ after 21 months excessive and justifiable only by affirmative
proof of respondent's danger to the public safety.”).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 207.
157. See, e.g., id. (“This case concerns an alien immigrant permanently
excluded from the United States . . . .”); id. at 213 (“Neither respondent’s
harborage on Ellis Island nor his prior residence here transforms this into
something other than an exclusion proceeding.”); Christopher R. Yukins, The
Measure of a Nation: Granting Excludable Aliens Fundamental Protections of
Due Process, 73 VA. L. REV. 1501, 1528 (1987) (“The Supreme Court, unlike the
lower courts, focused its inquiry in Mezei on exclusion, rather than detention.”).
158. See supra Part III.B for a discussion of Chae Chan Ping v. United
States.
159. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210
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Passport Act as valid Congressional action in furtherance of its
plenary power over immigration.160
However, in a stark departure from the Chinese Exclusion
Cases,161 the Court stated that “a lawful resident alien may not
captiously be deprived of his constitutional rights to procedural
due process.”162 Therefore, according to the Court, continued
exclusion of a “lawful resident alien” without a hearing would
violate that individual’s due process rights. Accordingly, the
Court sought to determine whether Mezei’s two-year harborage
at Ellis Island or his residency in the United States prior to
departing rendered him a “lawful resident alien.”163
First, the Court determined that, despite Mezei’s prior
residency in the United States, he would not be treated
differently than any other non-citizen attempting to enter the
United States.164 Regarding Mezei’s continued exclusion at Ellis
Island, the Court asserted that “such temporary harborage, an
act of legislative grace, bestows no additional rights.”165
(1953) (“Courts have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a
fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political
departments largely immune from judicial control.”); see also id. at 212
(“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as
an alien denied entry is concerned.” (quoting United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950))).
160. See id. at 210 (“In the exercise of these powers, Congress expressly
authorized the President to impose additional restrictions on aliens entering or
leaving the United States during periods of international tension and strife.
That authorization, originally enacted in the Passport Act of 1918, continues in
effect during the present emergency.”).
161. See supra Part III for a discussion of the Chinese Exclusion Cases.
162. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 213.
163. Id. at 213–15.
164. See id. at 213 (“For purposes of the immigration laws, moreover, the
legal incidents of an alien’s entry remain unaltered whether he has been here
once before or not. He is an entering alien just the same, and may be excluded if
unqualified for admission under existing immigration laws.”); see also id. at 214
[R]espondent, apparently without authorization or reentry papers,
simply left the United States and remained behind the Iron Curtain
for 19 months. Moreover . . . [§] 307 of the 1940 Nationality
Act . . . deems protracted absence such as respondent's a clear break
in an alien’s continuous residence here. In such circumstances, we
have no difficulty in holding respondent an entrant alien . . . .
165. Id. at 215; see also id. (“Congress meticulously specified that such
shelter ashore ‘shall not be considered a landing’ . . . . And this Court has long
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Therefore, the Court concluded that neither Mezei’s two-year
“harborage on Ellis Island nor his prior residence here transforms
this into something other than an exclusion proceeding.”166
After determining Mezei’s non-resident status, the Court
reversed the Second Circuit and denied Mezei’s release from Ellis
Island on bond.167 Additionally, as a non-resident, the Court
found that Mezei’s continued exclusion at Ellis Island did not
deprive him of any statutory or constitutional right.168
Despite Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei’s169
continued observance of Congress’s plenary power over
immigration,170 the opinion denotes a shift in the Court’s attitude
toward the rights of non-citizens in the United States. Straying
from the Fong Yue Ting majority opinion,171 the Mezei Court
instead applied Justice Field’s distinction between the rights of
non-citizens arriving to the United States and those already in
the country.172 The Mezei Court recognized Congress’s plenary
power toward “alien[s] on the threshold of initial entry” into the
United States.173 However, the Court also stated that non-citizens
residing in the United States should receive due process

considered such temporary arrangements as not affecting an alien’s status; he is
treated as if stopped at the border.”).
166. Id. at 213.
167. Id. at 216.
168. See id. at 215 (“Thus we do not think that respondent’s continued
exclusion deprives him of any statutory or constitutional right.”).
169. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
170. See id. at 210 (“Courts have long recognized the power to expel or
exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the
Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.”).
171. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) (“The
right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners who have not been naturalized, or
taken any steps towards becoming citizens of the country, rests upon the same
grounds, and is as absolute and unqualified, as the right to prohibit and prevent
their entrance into the country.”).
172. See supra notes 140–143 and accompanying text for further discussion
of Justice Field’s Fong Yue Ting dissent.
173. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212 (“But an alien on the threshold of initial
entry stands on a different footing: ‘Whatever the procedure authorized by
Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.’”
(quoting U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950))).
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protections.174 Therefore, under Mezei, Congress’s plenary power
no longer trumps the due process rights of “lawful resident
aliens” in the United States.
B. Zadvydas v. Davis
In Zadvydas v. Davis,175 the Court considered two separate
instances of continued detention176 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231.177
The Court consolidated the two cases and decided them
together.178
First, the Court discussed the case of Kestutis Zadvydas, a
German citizen who had lived in the United States since
immigrating with his parents when he was eight years old.179
After a series of arrests, the INS took Zadvydas into custody and
ordered him deported to Germany.180 However, Germany refused
to accept Zadvydas, which left him in custody indefinitely while
the INS considered alternative options.181
The second case the Court examined was that of Kim Ho
182
Ma.
Similar to Zadvydas, Ma was born overseas but lived in

174. See id. (“It is true that aliens who have once passed through our gates,
even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional
standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law.”); id. at 213 (“To be
sure, a lawful resident alien may not captiously be deprived of his constitutional
rights to procedural due process.”).
175. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
176. See id. at 686 (“Zadvydas asked us to review the decision of the Fifth
Circuit authorizing his continued detention. The Government asked us to review
the decision of the Ninth Circuit forbidding Ma’s continued detention. We
granted writs in both cases, agreeing to consider both statutory and related
constitutional questions.”).
177. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2012).
178. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 686 (“We consolidated the two cases for
argument; and we now decide them together.”).
179. Id. at 684.
180. See id. (“Most recently, he was convicted of possessing, with intent to
distribute, cocaine; sentenced to 16 years’ imprisonment; released on parole
after two years; taken into INS custody; and, in 1994, ordered deported to
Germany.”).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 685.
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the United States since he was seven years old.183 After serving
two years for a manslaughter conviction, the INS took Ma into
custody and ordered him deported.184 Ma’s detention also
continued indefinitely while the INS worked to finalize his
deportation.185
Section 1231(a)(1)(A) states that “when an alien is ordered
removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the
United States within a period of 90 days . . . .”186 Additionally,
§ 1231(a)(2) requires that the Government detain non-citizens
ordered deported during this ninety-day period.187 Further,
§ 1231(a)(6) allows the Government to detain non-citizens
ordered deported beyond the ninety-day removal period188 in
certain circumstances.189 At issue in Zadvydas was whether
§ 1231(a)(6) authorized indefinite detention of non-citizens
following a deportation order.190 The Government asserted that

183. Id.
184. See id. (“In 1995, at age 17, Ma was involved in a gang-related
shooting, convicted of manslaughter, and sentenced to 38 months’
imprisonment. He served two years, after which he was released into INS
custody. In light of his conviction of an ‘aggravated felony,’ Ma was ordered
removed.”).
185. Id. at 685–86.
186. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) (2012).
187. See id. § 1231(a)(2) (“During the removal period, the Attorney General
shall detain the alien. Under no circumstance during the removal period shall
the Attorney General release an alien who has been found inadmissible under
section 1182(a)(2) or 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable under section
1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title.”).
188. See id. § 1231(a)(6) (“An alien ordered removed . . . may be detained
beyond the removal period . . . .”).
189. See id.
An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under section 1182 of
this title, removable under section 1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or
1227(a)(4) of this title or who has been determined by the Attorney
General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the
order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal period . . . .
190. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001) (“In these cases, we
must decide whether this post-removal-period statute authorizes the Attorney
General to detain a removable alien indefinitely beyond the removal period or
only for a period reasonably necessary to secure the alien’s removal.”).
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the statute’s plain language provided the Attorney General with
such authority.191
Two key developments arose in Zadvydas. First, in response
to the Government’s claim that under Mezei, “alien status itself
can justify indefinite detention,”192 the Court distinguished
Zadvydas from Mezei193 on the ground that Mezei, unlike
Zadvydas, involved a non-resident “‘treated,’ for constitutional
purposes, ‘as if stopped at the border.’”194 Importantly, the Court
then stated that “once an alien enters the country, the legal
circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all
‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether
their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or
permanent.”195 Accordingly, the Court further bolstered the
distinction between non-citizens arriving to the United States
and non-citizens already residing in the country.196
191. See id. at 689
The Government argues that the statute means what it literally says.
It sets no “limit on the length of time beyond the removal period that
an alien who falls within one of the Section 1231(a)(6) categories may
be detained.” Hence, “whether to continue to detain such an alien
and, if so, in what circumstances and for how long” is up to the
Attorney General, not up to the courts. (quoting Brief for Petitioners
in No. 00–38, p. 22).
192. Id. at 692.
193. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei).
194. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693 (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex
rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215 (1953)). See also Medina, supra note 23, at 708
(“Instead of overruling the case, the Zadvydas Court distinguished Mezei on the
grounds that it involved an alien who had not entered the United States.”);
Susan Marx, Comment, Throwing Away the Key: The Constitutionality of the
Indefinite Detention of Inadmissible Aliens, 35 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1259, 1273
(2004)
While Mezei was an alien who had not yet entered the United States
and was therefore not sheltered by Constitutional protections,
Zadvydas and Ma were within the confines of the country and were
therefore entitled to Due Process. The Court determined that these
facts were too different to be treated equally and thus that the Mezei
decision did not control Zadvydas.
195. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693.
196. See id. (“The distinction between an alien who has effected an entry
into the United States and one who has never entered runs throughout
immigration law . . . . It is well established that certain constitutional
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The second major development in Zadvydas was the Court’s
position on Congress’s plenary power to regulate immigration.197
The Government argued that the statute at issue regulated
immigration-related matters, and because of Congress’s plenary
power in this field, the judiciary should “defer to Executive and
Legislative Branch decisionmaking in that area.”198 In response,
the Court stressed that Congress’s plenary power “is subject to
important constitutional limitations.”199
Ultimately, the Court asserted that a statute permitting
indefinite detention of resident non-citizens would raise a
constitutional problem.200 Accordingly, it appeared that the
Court, in contrast to the prior cases discussed,201 was poised to
strike down the relevant statute as unconstitutional. However,
the Court instead applied the constitutional avoidance doctrine to
sidestep addressing the statute’s constitutionality.202
Under the constitutional avoidance doctrine, “when an Act of
Congress raises ‘a serious doubt’ as to its constitutionality, [the]
protections available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to
aliens outside of our geographic borders.”).
197. See Whitney Chelgren, Preventive Detention Distorted: Why it is
Unconstitutional to Detain Immigrants Without Procedural Protections, 44 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1477, 1515 (2011) (“The Zadvydas decision is significant because it
places parameters on the government’s plenary power.”).
198. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (“The Government also
looks for support to cases holding that Congress has ‘plenary power’ to create
immigration law, and that the Judicial Branch must defer to Executive and
Legislative Branch decisionmaking in that area.”).
199. Id.
200. See id. at 690 (“A statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien
would
raise
a
serious
constitutional
problem . . . . Freedom
from
imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause
protects.”); see also id. at 692 (“The serious constitutional problem arising out of
a statute that, in these circumstances, permits an indefinite, perhaps
permanent, deprivation of human liberty without any such protection is
obvious.”).
201. See generally supra Parts III.B–C, IV.A.
202. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699 (“Consequently, interpreting the statute
to avoid a serious constitutional threat . . . .”). For a discussion on the
constitutional avoidance doctrine generally and its application in Zadvydas, see
generally Sanford G. Hooper, Note, Judicial Minimalism and the National
Dialogue on Immigration: The Constitutional Avoidance Doctrine in Zadvydas v.
Davis, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 975 (2002).
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‘Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is
fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.’”203
Accordingly, the Zadvydas Court interpreted the relevant statute
to limit detention “to a period reasonably necessary” to secure
deportation.204 As to what constitutes a reasonable amount of
time, the Court determined that the statute limits detention to
six months.205 Therefore, after six months in detention, “once the
alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the
Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that
showing.”206
C. Demore v. Kim
Hyung Joon Kim, a South Korean citizen, moved to
California with his parents in 1984 when he was six years old.207

203. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62
(1932)).
204. See id. (“[W]e read an implicit limitation into the statute before us. In
our view, the statute, read in light of the Constitution’s demands, limits an
alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring
about that alien’s removal from the United States. It does not permit indefinite
detention.”).
205. See id. at 701
We do have reason to believe, however, that Congress previously
doubted the constitutionality of detention for more than six
months. . . . Consequently, for the sake of uniform administration in
the federal courts, we recognize that period. After this 6-month
period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,
the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that
showing. And for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of
prior postremoval confinement grows, what counts as the “reasonably
foreseeable future” conversely would have to shrink. This 6-month
presumption, of course, does not mean that every alien not removed
must be released after six months. To the contrary, an alien may be
held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.
206. Id.
207. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513 (2003); Taylor, supra note 41, at 343.
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Two years later, Kim became a lawful permanent resident of the
United States.208
In 1996, when Kim was eighteen years old, he was arrested
and convicted of first-degree burglary.209 In 1997, Kim was
caught and subsequently convicted for shoplifting.210 Kim pleaded
guilty to petty theft with priors, a felony in California.211
Subsequently, the INS charged Kim with “being deportable from
the United States in light of these convictions, and detained him
pending his removal hearing.”212 Kim did not dispute the validity
of his prior convictions.213 Nor did Kim dispute that he was
subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c).214 Rather, Kim
filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the statute’s
constitutionality.215 Kim argued that “a system of mandatory
detention without any individualized ‘determination that he
posed either a danger to society or a flight risk’ violated the Due
Process Clause.”216
The Demore Court ultimately upheld the constitutionality of
§ 1226(c). The Demore outcome surprised many observers because
of the Court’s decision just two years prior in Zadvydas.217 To
208. Demore, 538 U.S. at 513.
209. Id.
210. Taylor, supra note 41, at 359.
211. See id. (“The prosecutor charged the offense as a ‘petty theft with
priors,’ punishable under state law as a felony, and Kim pleaded guilty to this
charge.”).
212. Demore, 538 U.S. at 513; see also Taylor, supra note 41, at 344 (“He was
charged with being deportable under a vastly expanded definition of ‘aggravated
felony’ in the newly amended immigration statute.”).
213. Demore, 538 U.S. at 513.
214. Id. at 513–14.
215. Id. at 514.
216. Silva, supra note 73, at 241–42 (quoting Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510,
514 (2003)).
217. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 41, at 364 (“By explicitly applying Salerno
and its progeny to lawful permanent residents detained by the INS, Zadvydas
seemed to neutralize plenary power arguments and bolster the claim that a
blanket mandate to detain non-citizen offenders without bond was
unconstitutional.”); Silva, supra note 73, at 241 (“Any concern that the Court
was drastically pruning the plenary power doctrine was extinguished, however,
two years in later in Demore v. Kim.”); see also supra Part IV.B (discussing the
Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas).
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remedy this apparent contradiction, the Court sought to
distinguish § 1226(c) from § 1231, the statute at issue in
Zadvydas.218
The Court distinguished § 1226(c) from § 1231 in two
respects. First, the Court compared the purposes of the two
statutes.219 The Court noted that in Zadvydas, the statute
governed “detention following a final order of removal.”220 The
Court then explained that because deportation of the petitioners
in Zadvydas was “no longer practicably attainable,”221 continued
detention no longer served the intended statutory purpose.222 In
contrast, the Court asserted that in Demore, “the statutory
provision at issue governs detention of deportable criminal aliens
pending their removal proceedings.”223 Accordingly, the Court
found that as long as removal proceedings were ongoing, such
detention continued to serve the intended statutory purpose.224
Next, the Court compared the length of detention under the
two statutes.225 The Court found that under § 1231, detention
“was ‘indefinite’ and ‘potentially permanent.’”226 In contrast, the
Court stated that § 1226(c) posed no such problem because it

218. See Taylor, supra note 41, at 365 (“[T]he Demore Court simply
distinguished Zadvydas on its facts, focusing on purported differences in the
purpose and length of detention in the pre-hearing and post-order contexts.”).
219. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 527–28 (2003) (comparing the
purposes of §§ 1226(c) and 1231).
220. Id. at 527.
221. Id. (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001)).
222. See id. (“First, in Zadvydas, the aliens challenging their detention
following final orders of deportation were ones for whom removal was ‘no longer
practically attainable.’ The Court thus held that the detention there did not
serve its purported immigration purpose.” (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 690 (2001))).
223. Id. at 527–28.
224. See id. at 528 (“Such detention necessarily serves the purpose of
preventing deportable criminal aliens from fleeing prior to or during their
removal proceedings, thus increasing the chance that, if ordered removed, the
aliens will be successfully removed.”).
225. See id. (“While the period of detention at issue in Zadvydas was
‘indefinite’ and ‘potentially permanent,’ the detention here is of a much shorter
duration.” (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690–91 (2001))).
226. See id. (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690–91 (2001)).
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contained “a definite termination point”227 and “in the majority of
cases it lasts for less than the 90 days . . . considered
presumptively valid in Zadvydas.”228 Therefore, the Court
partially relied on the temporal, finite nature of detention under
§ 1226(c) to distinguish it from the statute at issue in
Zadvydas.229
Regarding the length of detention under § 1226(c), it has
recently come to light that the Demore Court relied on erroneous
data from the Department of Justice.230 Newly discovered
information obtained through Freedom of Information Act
requests show that the Department of Justice “greatly
understated the time certain aliens with criminal records spend
in no-bail detention.”231 The Demore Court found that “in the
majority of cases [detention] lasts for less than the 90
days . . . considered presumptively valid in Zadvydas.”232
However, the recently released data shows that “the average
detention period was 382 days, [with a] median of 272 days.”233
Regarding the Demore Court’s use of erroneous data, Solicitor
General Ian Gershengorn stated that “[t]he conclusion the court
drew is understandable, but it is incorrect.”234
In addition to the controversy surrounding the faulty data
relied on in Demore, an unspoken, external factor may have
influenced the Court’s surprising effort to distance itself from
227. Id. at 529.
228. Id.
229. See id. at 528 (“Zadvydas is materially different from the present case
in a second respect as well. While the period of detention at issue in Zadvydas
was ‘indefinite’ and ‘potentially permanent,’ the detention here is of a much
shorter duration.” (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690–91 (2001))).
230. See Jess Bravin, Justice Department Gave Supreme Court Incorrect
Data in Immigration Case, WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/justicedepartment-gave-supreme-court-incorrect-data-in-immigration-case1472569756 (last updated Aug. 30, 2016, 3:48 PM) (last visited Sept. 2, 2017)
(“The Justice Department said it provided the Supreme Court with erroneous
information that helped it win a 2003 case upholding a blanket policy of denying
bail to thousands of immigrants imprisoned while appealing deportation
orders.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
231. Id.
232. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 529 (2003).
233. Bravin, supra note 230.
234. Id.

LOCKED UP

2369

Zadvydas.235 Scholars posit that the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001 likely played a role in the Court’s decision.236
In the aftermath of the attacks, “the George W. Bush
administration profiled and preventatively detained large
numbers of Muslim, Middle Eastern, and South Asian men, often
by initiating removal proceedings against them.”237 Although Kim
was not charged with any terrorism-related offenses, the Court
likely recognized that its ruling could interfere with the “[Bush]
administration’s ability to detain people without hearings for
national security purposes.”238 Therefore, the Court may have
strayed from Zadvydas in a deliberate attempt to avoid
disrupting the Government’s response to the 9/11 attacks.239
Regardless of the Court’s motive, in a 5–4 decision the
Demore Court upheld the constitutionality of § 1226(c) and its
mandatory detention regime.240 In doing so, the Court carved
235. See Taylor, supra note 41, at 365 (“But this result was not completely
unexpected, for a reason never mentioned within the four corners of the Demore
decision.”).
236. See Anello, supra note 40, at 376 (“The Demore majority’s approach
differed in significant ways from Zadvydas and its predecessors. The shift in
doctrine reflected the political aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks.”); Taylor, supra note 41, at 345 (“It is the historical context of Demore v.
Kim, rather than Court’s analysis of precedent, that explains the outcome.”).
237. Anello, supra note 40, at 376; see also id. (“[T]he Court’s emphasis on
Congress’s public safety concerns, along with the Bush administration’s use of
immigration detention for investigatory or preventative purposes indicates a
concern for preserving the administration’s ability to detain people without
hearings for national security purposes.”); Taylor, supra note 41, at 365 (“It was
decided against the backdrop of the detention of hundreds of Arab and Muslim
non-citizens in connection with the 9/11 terrorism investigation, who were taken
into INS custody and held without bond until they were cleared by the FBI.”).
238. Anello, supra note 40, at 376; see also Taylor, supra note 41, at 365
(“[B]oth sides knew that the case could affect the government’s claimed
authority to detain without bond any non-citizens deemed ‘of interest’ to the
terrorism investigation.”).
239. See Taylor, supra note 41, at 365 (“[W]hile the Court studiously avoided
commenting on the social and political context of the case, surely the justices
saw the connection as well.”).
240. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513 (2003) (“We hold that
Congress . . . may require that persons such as respondent be detained for the
brief period necessary for their removal proceedings.”); id. at 531 (“For the
reasons set forth above, respondent’s claim must fail. Detention during removal
proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process.”).
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back at the limitations the Zadvydas Court placed on Congress’s
plenary power over immigration.241
Additionally, the Demore Court declined to follow the
discussed precedent242 bifurcating the due process rights of
non-citizens first arriving to the United States from those already
in the United States.243 Rather, the Court stated that “Congress
may make rules as to aliens that would be unacceptable if applied
to citizens.”244 The Court failed to distinguish between “aliens”
arriving to the United States and “aliens” already residing in the
country.245 Accordingly, the Court implied that non-citizens, even
lawful permanent residents such as Kim, do not possess the same
due process rights as citizens.246

241. See Taylor, supra note 41, at 363 (“But Demore v. Kim might
nevertheless be called a surprising decision, because just two years earlier it
had seemed that the Supreme Court was backing away from a strong version of
plenary power deference identified with the Cold War era.”); see also id. at 362–
63 (“Rather than apply careful due process scrutiny to the statute, the Court
instead invoked a ‘fundamental premise of immigration law’—deference to the
political branches’ plenary power to control immigration.”).
242. See Denise Gilman, Realizing Liberty: The Use of International Human
Rights Law to Realign Immigration Detention in the United States, 36 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 243, 290–91 (2013) (“It is difficult to see the basis for the Demore
decision in specific constitutional precedent. In fact, the decision diverges
significantly from the Supreme Court’s decision just two years earlier in
Zadvydas.”).
243. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“The distinction
between an alien who has effected an entry into the United States and one who
has never entered runs throughout immigration law.”); Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (“It is true that aliens who have
once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after
proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due
process of law.”); id. at 213 (“To be sure, a lawful resident alien may not
captiously be deprived of his constitutional rights to procedural due process.”).
For further discussion of Mezei and Zadvydas, see supra Parts IV.A–B.
244. Demore, 538 U.S. at 522 (emphasis added).
245. See Medina, supra note 23, at 698 (“Demore treats permanent resident
aliens as if they are indistinguishable from unauthorized resident aliens or
aliens who are inadmissible to the United States.”).
246. See id. at 697 (“The Court holds that aliens are entitled to a less
heightened standard of scrutiny under the Due Process Clause than citizens,
even when the governmental action being challenged involves a fundamental
human right—the right to physical liberty.”).
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As previously mentioned, the Court’s decision was stunning
to many, particularly in light of the Zadvydas decision only two
years prior.247 The decision spawned the current circuit split and
is critically important because it declared the constitutionality of
mandatory, indeterminate detention without bail for non-citizen
residents of the United States.248
V. Analyzing the Federal Circuit Split
Over the past decade, lower courts have struggled to
reconcile Demore and Zadvydas in the context of § 1226(c)
detention.249 However, each circuit to weigh in on § 1226(c) has
ultimately followed Zadvydas in two respects.250 First, the
circuits unanimously declined to endorse indeterminate
mandatory detention.251 Second, attempting to avoid addressing
247. See Taylor, supra note 41, at 363 (“But Demore v. Kim might
nevertheless be called a surprising decision, because just two years earlier it
had seemed that the Supreme Court was backing away from a strong version of
plenary power deference identified with the Cold War era.”); Anello, supra note
40, at 363 (“Such a sweeping, categorical detention is not easily reconciled with
the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in Zadvydas v. Davis, which extended to
immigration detention the due process limits that the Court has recognized on
other forms of civil detention.”).
248. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003) (“Detention during
removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process.”).
249. See, e.g., Michelle Firmacion, Note, Protecting Immigrants From
Prolonged Pre-Removal Detention: When “It Depends” is no Longer Reasonable,
42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 601, 608 (2015) (“Lower courts have struggled to
reconcile Zadvydas and Demore in the context of pre-removal detention.”);
Anello, supra note 40, at 363 (“Throughout the past decade, lower courts have
sought to reconcile Demore with Zadvydas.”).
250. See, e.g., Anello, supra note 40, at 383 (“Since Demore, lower courts
have endeavored to implement the Supreme Court’s holding in a way that is
most consistent with the due process principles recognized in Zadvydas and its
predecessors.”); Taylor, supra note 41, at 366 (“Already the lower courts, when
asked to reconcile Demore with the rest of due process jurisprudence, have read
Demore narrowly while more readily embracing the Zadvydas approach.”).
251. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 2013)
(“[W]hile mandatory detention under § 1226(c) is not constitutionally
impermissible per se, the statute cannot be read to authorize mandatory
detention of criminal aliens with no limit on the duration of imprisonment.”); Ly
v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 269 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Zadvydas established that
deportable aliens, even those who had already been ordered removed, possess a
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the statute’s constitutionality, each circuit chose to read an
implicit time limitation into § 1226(c).252
However, despite the circuits’ unanimous agreement that
“section 1226(c) includes some ‘reasonable’ limit on the amount of
time that an individual can be detained without a bail hearing,
courts remain divided on how to determine reasonableness.”253
This division among the circuits over “how to determine
reasonableness”254 marks the essence of the current split.
A. Individualized Reviews of Reasonableness
In evaluating “the amount of time that an individual can be
detained without a bail hearing,”255 the First, Third and Sixth
Circuits call for individualized reviews to determine whether
detention under § 1226(c) has become unreasonable.256 Under this
substantive Fifth Amendment liberty interest, and that interest was violated by
indefinite detention.”).
252. See Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486, 494 (1st Cir. 2016) (“And, each
circuit has found it necessary to read an implicit reasonableness requirement
into the statute itself, generally based on the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance.”); see also Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 616 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[W]e
hold that, in order to avoid the constitutional concerns raised by indefinite
detention, an immigrant detained pursuant to section 1226(c) must be afforded
a bail hearing before an immigration judge within six months of his or her
detention.”); Rodriguez, 715 F.3d at 1138 (“Consistent with our previous
decisions, we conclude that, to avoid constitutional concerns, § 1226(c)’s
mandatory language must be construed ‘to contain an implicit “reasonable time”
limitation, the application of which is subject to federal-court review.’” (quoting
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001))); Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656
F.3d 221, 231 (3d Cir. 2011)
“[I]t is a cardinal principle of statutory interpretation . . . that when
an Act of Congress raises a serious doubt as to its
constitutionality . . . [courts] will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question
may be avoided.” Applying this principle to 1226(c) we conclude that
the statute implicitly authorizes detention for a reasonable amount of
time . . . . (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001))).
253. Lora, 804 F.3d at 614.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See, e.g., Reid, 819 F.3d at 501 (“Our ruling today, requiring an
individualized approach, removes that predicate.”); Diop, 656 F.3d at 232–33
(“At a certain point, continued detention becomes unreasonable . . . . This will
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rule, “every detainee must file a habeas petition challenging
detention, and the district courts must then adjudicate the
petition to determine whether the individual’s detention has
crossed the ‘reasonableness’ threshold, thus entitling him to a
bail hearing.”257
In Ly v. Hansen,258 the district director of the INS appealed a
district court ruling granting habeas corpus to Hoang Minh Ly,259
a lawful permanent resident as of 1987.260 The INS took Ly into
custody on May 11, 1999, and kept him in detention for 500 days
before a district court ordered his release.261
Upon analyzing the legal landscape relating to § 1226(c), the
Sixth Circuit declined to follow the Demore Court’s ruling that
§ 1226(c) “was not unconstitutional in requiring the detention of
deportable aliens pending their deportation.”262 The Sixth Circuit
distinguished Ly from Demore on the ground that, in Demore,
“Kim was a deportable alien for whom deportation, to South
Korea, was a real possibility.”263 In contrast, the Sixth Circuit
found that Ly’s deportation was never a real possibility.264
necessarily be a fact-dependent inquiry that will vary depending on individual
circumstances. We decline to establish a universal point at which detention
always be considered unreasonable.”); Ly, 351 F.3d at 273 (“We hold that the
INS may detain prima facie removable criminal aliens, without bond, for a
reasonable period of time . . . . The reasonableness of the length of detention is
subject to review by federal courts in habeas proceedings . . . .”).
257. Reid, 819 F.3d at 495 (quoting Lora, 804 F.3d at 614).
258. 351 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2003).
259. Id. at 265.
260. See id. at 274 (Haynes, J., dissenting) (“The United States Attorney
General granted Ly refugee status when he entered the United States. Ly
became a permanent United States resident on December 21, 1987, and has
lived in the United States with other family members who are also permanent
residents.”).
261. Id. at 265.
262. Id. at 270.
263. Id.
264. See id. at 265 n.1 (“Actual removal of Ly from the United States was
never a possibility during this process. Vietnam has not and does not accept
deportees because there is no repatriation agreement between the United States
and Vietnam.”). But see Julia Preston, Vietnam Agrees to the Return of Deportees
From
the
U.S.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
23,
2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/23/us/23immig.html (last visited Sept. 19,
2017) (noting that in 2008, “American immigration authorities reached an
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Instead of following Demore, the Sixth Circuit looked to
Zadvydas for guidance.265 On the issue of mandatory detention,
the Sixth Circuit observed that Zadvydas did sanction mandatory
detention of non-citizens without a bond hearing.266 However, the
Sixth Circuit also agreed with the Zadvydas Court that a statute
authorizing indeterminate mandatory detention posed a
constitutional problem.267 Therefore, in accordance with
Zadvydas, the Sixth Circuit sought to read a reasonable time
limitation on mandatory detention into § 1226(c) to avoid
addressing the statute’s constitutionality.268
In determining what type of limitation to read into § 1226(c),
the Sixth Circuit declined to adopt the bright-line, six-month
limitation imposed in Zadvydas.269 Rather, the Sixth Circuit
found that the unpredictable nature of removal proceedings
demanded more flexibility than the post-removal detention at

agreement . . . with Vietnam that clears the way for Vietnamese immigrants
under deportation orders to be sent back to their country”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
265. Ly, 351 F.3d at 267 (“The question remaining before us is whether the
holding of Zadvydas extends to the mandatory pre-removal detention
statute . . . .”).
266. See id. at 267–68 (“Zadvydas also made clear that limited civil
detention, without bond, is constitutional as applied to deportable aliens.”).
267. See id. at 269 (“[A]lthough criminal aliens may be incarcerated pending
removal, the time of incarceration is limited by constitutional considerations,
and must bear a reasonable relation to removal.”); see also id. at 267
Congress has ordered that aliens who have been convicted of an
aggravated felony or two crimes involving moral turpitude (including
fraud) must be detained pending removal proceedings, based on a
prima facie determination of removability by the government. If an
order of removal is not entered (or not entered promptly), the result is
mandatory indefinite detention for criminal aliens, which is
prohibited by Zadvydas.
268. See id. at 267 (“Since permanent detention of Permanent Resident
Aliens under § 236 would be unconstitutional, we construe the statute to avoid
that result, as did the Court in Zadvydas.”); id. at 270 (“[B]y construing the
pre-removal detention statute to include an implicit requirement that removal
proceedings be concluded within a reasonable time, we avoid the need to
mandate the procedural protections that would be required to detain deportable
aliens indefinitely.”).
269. See id. at 271 (“A bright-line time limitation, as imposed in Zadvydas,
would not be appropriate for the pre-removal period . . . .”).
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issue in Zadvydas.270 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit determined
that courts must conduct individualized inquiries into the
reasonableness of ongoing detention under § 1226(c).271 The Sixth
Circuit concluded that “[w]hen actual removal is not reasonably
foreseeable, deportable aliens may not be indefinitely detained
without a government showing of a ‘strong special justification,’
constituting more than a threat to the community, that
overbalances the alien’s liberty interest.”272
As in Ly, the Third Circuit in Diop v. ICE/Homeland
Security273 acknowledged the constitutional problem with a
statute authorizing mandatory, indeterminate detention without
a bond hearing.274 To avoid a constitutional problem, the Third
Circuit also cited Zadvydas and sought to read a limitation on
mandatory detention into § 1226(c).275 Additionally, as in Ly, the
Third Circuit declined to “establish a universal point at which
detention will always be considered unreasonable.”276 Rather, the
Third Circuit stated that reasonableness depends on “whether
continued detention is necessary to carry out the statute’s
purpose”277 and that “[r]easonableness, by its very nature, is a
fact-dependent inquiry requiring an assessment of all of the
270. See id. (“A bright-line time limitation, as imposed in Zadvydas, would
not be appropriate for the pre-removal period; hearing schedules and other
proceedings must have leeway for expansion or contraction as the necessities of
the case and the immigration judge’s caseload warrant.”).
271. See id. (“In the absence of a set period of time, courts must examine the
facts of each case, to determine whether there has been unreasonable delay in
concluding removal proceedings.”).
272. Id. at 273.
273. 656 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2011).
274. See id. at 231 (discussing § 1226(c)’s due process implications).
275. See id.
[I]t is a cardinal principle of statutory interpretation . . . that when
an Act of Congress raises a serious doubt as to its
constitutionality . . . [courts] will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question
may be avoided.” Applying this principle to 1226(c) we conclude that
the statute implicitly authorizes detention for a reasonable amount of
time . . . .
(quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001)).
276. Id. at 233.
277. Id. at 235.
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circumstances of any given case.”278 Therefore, “when detention
becomes unreasonable, the Due Process Clause demands a
hearing, at which the Government bears the burden of proving
that continued detention is necessary to fulfill the purposes of the
detention statute.”279
The First Circuit is the latest circuit to weigh in on the
current split. In Reid v. Donelan,280 the Government appealed a
district court decision that Mark Anthony Reid’s continued
detention under § 1226(c) was unreasonable absent a bond
hearing.281 Reid, a lawful permanent resident since 1978 and a
U.S. Army veteran, challenged his continued detention after
spending eight months in INS custody.282
On appeal, the First Circuit noted that “[t]he concept of a
categorical, mandatory, and indeterminate detention raises
severe constitutional concerns.”283 The First Circuit then
determined that, as in Zadvydas, it would “read an implicit
reasonableness limitation into the statute to avoid constitutional
conflict.”284
As to what limitation to apply, the First Circuit surveyed the
current circuit split and discussed whether to apply
individualized reviews as in the Third and Sixth Circuits, or
whether to apply a bright-line rule as in the Second and Ninth
Circuits.285
The First Circuit stated that, on a practical level, it preferred
the Second and Ninth Circuits’ bright-line approach.286 However,
the First Circuit provided several reasons why it felt restrained
278. Id. at 234.
279. Id. at 233.
280. 819 F.3d 486 (1st Cir. 2016).
281. Id. at 492.
282. Id. at 491.
283. Id. at 494.
284. Id. at 496.
285. See id. at 494–95 (“And, each circuit has found it necessary to read an
implicit reasonableness requirement into the statue itself, generally based on
the doctrine of constitutional avoidance . . . . Yet, the courts of appeals have split
on the method for enforcing this statutory reasonableness requirement.”).
286. See id. at 498 (“Despite the practical advantages of the Second and
Ninth Circuits’ approach . . . .”).
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from adopting such a rule.287 First, as in Ly, the First Circuit
stated that Zadvydas’ six-month rule simply does not make sense
in the context of § 1226(c) detention.288 Next, the First Circuit
viewed Demore as effectively barring its “ability to adopt a firm
six-month rule.”289 Finally, the First Circuit asserted that “the
inherent nature of the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry weigh[s] heavily
against
adopting
a
six-month
presumption
of
unreasonableness.”290
Regarding individualized reviews, the First Circuit stated
that “[f]rom a more practical standpoint . . . the approach
employed by the Third and Sixth Circuits has little to recommend
it.”291 The First Circuit went on to describe several potential
pitfalls associated with individualized reviews.292 However,
despite the First Circuit’s preference for a bright-line rule on a
practical level, the court felt compelled to adopt the Third and
Sixth Circuits’ individualized approach.293 As a result, the First

287. See id. at 495 (“From a strictly legal perspective, we think that the
Third and Sixth Circuits have the better of the argument.”).
288. See id. at 496 (“Although it is tempting to transplant this [six-month]
presumption into § 1226(c) based on the superficial similarities of the problems
posed, such a presumption has no place here.”).
289. Id. at 497; see also id. (“In Demore, the Supreme Court declined to state
any specific time limit in a case involving a detainee who had already been held
for approximately six months . . . . The Demore Court also briefly discussed facts
specific to the detainee . . . .”).
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. See id. at 497–98
First, the approach has resulted in wildly inconsistent
determinations . . . . Second, the failure to adopt a bright-line rule
may have the perverse effect of increasing detention times for those
least likely to actually be removed at the conclusion of their
proceedings . . . . Third, even courts that have adopted the
individualized habeas approach have questioned the federal courts’
“institutional competence” to adjudicate these issues and the
consequences of such an interpretation.
293. See id. at 498 (“[W]e have surveyed the legal landscape and consider
ourselves duty-bound to follow the trail set out by the Third and Sixth
Circuits . . . . In the end, we think the Third and Sixth Circuits’ individualized
approach adheres more closely to legal precedent than the extraordinary
intervention requested by Petitioner.”).
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Circuit joined the Third and Sixth Circuits’ side of the current
split.
B. Bright-line, Six-Month Reasonableness Limitation on Detention
In order to avoid addressing the constitutionality of § 1226(c),
the Second and Ninth Circuits read a bright-line, six-month
reasonableness limit into the statute.294 Under the bright-line
rule, a non-citizen detained under § 1226(c) “must be provided a
bond hearing once his or her detention reaches the six-month
mark, because any categorical and mandatory detention beyond
that timeframe is presumptively unreasonable.”295
In Rodriguez v. Robbins,296 the Ninth Circuit heard an appeal
regarding a class of non-citizens who challenged “their prolonged
detention . . . without individualized bond hearings and
determinations to justify their continued detention.”297 The class
members had each been detained for over six months pursuant to
either 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)298 or 1226(c).299
As to § 1226(c), the Ninth Circuit sought to determine
whether mandatory detention of non-citizens “for prolonged
periods raises the constitutional concerns identified by the
Supreme Court in Zadvydas, or whether such detention is
consistent with Demore and, thereby, permissible.”300

294. See Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 616 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[W]e hold
that, in order to avoid the constitutional concerns raised by indefinite detention,
an immigrant detained pursuant to section 1226(c) must be afforded a bail
hearing before an immigration judge within six months of his or her
detention.”); Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013)
(“Therefore, subclass members who have been detained under § 1226(c) for six
months are entitled to a bond hearing . . . .”).
295. Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486, 495 (1st Cir. 2016).
296. 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013).
297. Id. at 1130.
298. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (2012).
299. See Rodriguez, 715 F.3d at 1131 (“This appeal concerns individuals
detained in southern California for six months or longer under one of two
federal immigration statutes.”).
300. Id. at 1134.
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Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit found that Demore is limited to
detentions of brief duration.301 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit
stated that “while mandatory detention under section 1226(c) is
not constitutionally impermissible per se, the statute cannot be
read to authorize mandatory detention of criminal aliens with no
limit on the duration of imprisonment.”302 Accordingly, the Ninth
Circuit, citing Zadvydas, set out to read a “reasonable time
limitation” into § 1226(c).303
As to what “reasonable time limitation” to read into the
statute, the court looked to a prior Ninth Circuit decision for
guidance.304 In Diouf v. Napolitano,305 the Ninth Circuit
addressed the issue of “prolonged” detention under a separate
immigration-related statute.306 In that case, the court ruled that
detention exceeding six months constituted “prolonged” detention
and required a bond hearing before an immigration judge.307
The Rodriguez court acknowledged that detention under
§ 1226(c) was not at issue in Diouf.308 Nevertheless, the
Rodriguez court decided to read the same six-month limitation

301. See id. at 1137 (“We have addressed the question of how broadly
Demore sweeps in several decisions over the past decade. On each of these
occasions, we have consistently held that Demore’s holding is limited to
detentions of brief duration.”).
302. Id.
303. See id. at 1138 (“Consistent with our previous decisions, we conclude
that, to avoid constitutional concerns, § 1226(c)’s mandatory language must be
construed ‘to contain an implicit “reasonable time” limitation, the application of
which is subject to federal-court review.’” (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 682 (2001))).
304. See id. at 1139 (“The government is likewise correct that Diouf II by its
terms addressed detention under § 1231(a)(6), not § 1226(c) or § 1225(b). But
Diouf II strongly suggested that immigration detention becomes prolonged at
the six-month mark regardless of the authorizing statute.”).
305. 634 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2011).
306. See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Second,
in Diouf . . . we addressed the definition of ‘prolonged’ detention for purposes of
the Casas bond hearing requirement. Diouf II first extended the holding of
Casas to aliens discretionarily detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).”).
307. See id. (“Importantly, we indicated that an ‘alien’s continuing detention
becomes prolonged’ at the 180–day mark” (quoting Diouf, 634 F.3d at 1091)).
308. See id. at 1139 (“The government is likewise correct that Diouf II by its
terms addressed detention under § 1231(a)(6), not § 1226(c) . . . .”).
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into § 1226(c).309 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit determined that
non-citizens “detained under § 1226(c) for six months are entitled
to a bond hearing.”310
In Lora v. Shanahan,311 the Second Circuit heard the
government’s appeal following an order releasing Alexander
Lora312 on bond pending his removal proceedings.313 On appeal,
the Second Circuit sought to determine, among other issues,
whether mandatory, indeterminate detention without a bond
hearing violated Lora’s due process rights.314 The Second Circuit
stated that it would read an implicit limitation into § 1226(c) “in
order to avoid significant constitutional concerns.”315 The Second
Circuit then provided several reasons justifying applying a
bright-line, six-month reasonableness limit to mandatory
detention under § 1226(c).316
First, the Second Circuit noted that the Zadvydas Court
implemented a six-month reasonableness limitation on detention
in a related context.317 Next, the Second Circuit found that a
309. See id. (“But Diouf II strongly suggested that immigration detention
becomes prolonged at the six-month mark regardless of the authorizing
statute.”).
310. Id. at 1138.
311. 804 F.3d 601 (2d Cir. 2015).
312. See infra Part I for more on Alexander Lora and his story.
313. See Lora, 804 F.3d at 605 (“[T]he immigration judge (‘IJ’) ordered
Lora’s release conditioned on posting a $5000 bond. This appeal followed.”).
314. See id. at 613 (“Lora also argued below and argues to this Court that
his indefinite detention without being afforded a bond hearing would violate his
right to due process.”).
315. Id. at 606.
316. See id. at 614–15
We believe that, considering the relevant Supreme Court precedent,
the pervasive confusion over what constitutes a “reasonable” length of
time that an immigrant can be detained without a bail hearing, the
current immigration backlog and the disastrous impact of mandatory
detention on the lives of immigrants who are neither a flight risk nor
dangerous, the interests at stake in this Circuit are best served by
the bright-line approach.
317. See id. at 615 (“In Zadvydas, the Court held that six months was a
‘presumptively reasonable period of detention’ in a related context, namely
post-removal-determination detention.” (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 700–01 (2001))).
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bright-line rule would “ensure[] that similarly situated detainees
receive similar treatment”318 and would result in “more certainty
and predictability” in its application.319 Finally, the Second
Circuit expressed concern about the effect that individualized
determinations of reasonableness, and the uncertainty that
comes with it, would have on non-citizens and their families.320
Therefore, the Second Circuit upheld mandatory detention
under § 1226(c), but stated that “to avoid the constitutional
concerns raised by indefinite detention, an immigrant detained
pursuant to section 1226(c) must be afforded a bail hearing before
an immigration judge within six months of his or her
detention.”321 The Second Circuit concluded that at the bail
hearing, “the detainee must be admitted to bail unless the
government establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the
immigrant poses a risk of flight or a risk of danger to the
community.”322
VI. Recommendation to Resolve the Circuit Split
At the time of this writing, the circuits remain split
three-to-two, with both sides refusing to endorse the Demore
Court’s decision, sanctioning mandatory, indeterminate detention
of non-citizens under § 1226(c).323 Instead, to avoid prolonged
detention under § 1226(c), the circuits on both sides of the split
interpret the statute to include an “implicit reasonable time
limitation”324 on mandatory detention.325 The First, Third, and
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. See id. at 616 (“Finally, without a six-month rule, endless months of
detention, often caused by nothing more than bureaucratic backlog, has real-life
consequences for immigrants and their families.”).
321. Id.
322. Id. (citing Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2013)).
323. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 2013)
(“[W]hile mandatory detention under § 1226(c) is not constitutionally
impermissible per se, the statute cannot be read to authorize mandatory
detention of criminal aliens with no limit on the duration of imprisonment.”).
324. Buckman, supra note 71, § 6.5.
325. See Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486, 494 (1st Cir. 2016) (“And, each
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Sixth Circuits call for individualized reviews to determine
whether mandatory detention has become unreasonable,326 while
the Second and Ninth Circuits maintain that mandatory
detention becomes presumptively unreasonable after six
months.327 However, both circuits’ approaches, as argued below,
fail to provide non-citizen arrestees with adequate due process.328
Therefore, neither side’s approach constitutes an acceptable
resolution to the current circuit split. To resolve the split, the
Court should revisit its anomalous Demore decision to protect the
due process rights of non-citizens in the United States.
A. Demore’s Inconsistency with Due Process Jurisprudence
Beginning in 1893, the Court has routinely provided that the
Fifth Amendment’s due process rights apply to all individuals
within the United States, including non-citizens.329 Accordingly,
circuit has found it necessary to read an implicit reasonableness requirement
into the statute itself, generally based on the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance.”).
326. See supra Part V.A (discussing the First, Third, and Sixth Circuits’
interpretations of § 1226(c)).
327. See supra Part V.B (discussing the Second and Ninth Circuits’
interpretations of § 1226(c)).
328. See infra Part VI.C (describing the Fifth Amendment problem with
both sides of the circuit split’s approaches).
329. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“But once an alien
enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause
applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their
presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”); Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (“Whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien
is surely a ‘person’ in any ordinary sense of that term. Aliens, even aliens whose
presence in this country is unlawful, have long been recognized as ‘persons’
guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”);
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (“There are literally millions of aliens
within the jurisdiction of the United States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as
the Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of these persons from
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”);
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (“It is true
that aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be
expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness
encompassed in due process of law.”); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S.
228, 238 (1896) (“[T]o the fifth and sixth amendments, it must be concluded that
all persons within the territory of the United States are entitled to the

LOCKED UP

2383

in 2001, the Zadvydas Court recognized that Congress’s plenary
power “is subject to important constitutional limitations”330 and
that “once an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance
changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within
the United States, including aliens.”331 Yet, just two years later,
the Demore Court flatly stated that “th[e] Court has firmly and
repeatedly endorsed the proposition that Congress may make
rules as to aliens that would be unacceptable if applied to
citizens.”332 The Demore Court’s assertion of a ubiquitous dividing
line between the rights of citizens and non-citizens represents an
archaic view of Congress’s plenary power333 and fractures the
otherwise harmonious due process jurisprudence previously
mentioned.334
As discussed above, the Court has repeatedly stated that the
Due Process Clause applies to non-citizens in the United
States.335 Therefore, if the Court were to revisit Demore, the
question should become whether § 1226(c) survives a Fifth
Amendment challenge absent judicial deference to a robust
concept of plenary power. To answer this question, the Court
should look to Fifth Amendment jurisprudence in a context
similar to § 1226(c)’s pre-removal detention.
protection guarantied [sic] by those amendments, and that even aliens shall
not . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”);
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 754 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting)
(“Aliens from countries at peace with us, domiciled within our country by its
consent, are entitled to all the guaranties for the protection of their persons and
property which are secured to native-born citizens.”).
330. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695.
331. Id. at 693.
332. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003).
333. See Taylor, supra note 41, at 363 (“But Demore v. Kim might
nevertheless be called a surprising decision, because just two years earlier it
had seemed that the Supreme Court was backing away from a strong version of
plenary power deference identified with the Cold War Era.”).
334. See id. at 366 (“The [Demore] decision is inconsistent with Zadvydas
and the Salerno line of cases, and thus may be unstable as precedent.”).
335. See McCaslin, supra note 69, at 202 (“As far back as the late nineteenth
century, the Supreme Court recognized that aliens within the borders of the
United States are ‘persons’ entitled to the protection of the United States
Constitution and thereby to the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process.”).
For a list of Supreme Court precedent delineating the due process rights of
non-citizens in the United States, see supra note 329 and accompanying text.
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As to relevant Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, past
scholarship336 and the Demore dissent337 have referred to the
United States v. Salerno338 line of preventive detention cases
when discussing § 1226(c). Of those cases, mandatory detention
under § 1226(c) most closely resembles the Bail Reform Act of
1984’s (Bail Reform Act) pretrial preventive detention regime at
issue in Salerno.339 Both § 1226(c) and the Bail Reform Act call
for detention prior to a proceeding—whether it be a trial or
deportation hearing—to prevent a risk of flight or danger to
others.340 In Salerno, the Court upheld the Bail Reform Act
against a Fifth Amendment challenge on the ground that the
statute’s “extensive safeguards suffice to repel a facial
challenge.”341 In sum, if resident non-citizens receive the same
due process rights as citizens, as argued here, and the Bail
Reform Act’s comparable pretrial detention regime withstood a
Fifth Amendment challenge in Salerno—a Court revisiting
Demore should look to Salerno and the Bail Reform Act to

336. Taylor, supra note 41, at 363–64; Chelgren, supra note 197, at 1489–91;
Medina, supra note 23, at 731–39; Anello, supra note 40, at 373–83.
337. Demore, 538 U.S. at 561 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“In any case, the analytical framework set forth in Salerno, Foucha,
Hendricks, Jackson, and other physical confinement cases applies to both, and
the two differences the Court relies upon fail to remove Kim’s challenge from the
ambit of either the earlier cases or Zadvydas itself.”).
338. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
339. See Chelgren, supra note 197, at 1489–90 (“Immigration detention,
therefore, is essentially preventive detention—it is not meant to exact a punitive
sentence but is an administrative measure designed to help the government
keep track of immigrants who might ultimately be ordered removed and to
prevent removable immigrants from committing crimes in the interim.”).
340. Compare Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 528 (2003) (“Such detention
necessarily serves the purpose of preventing deportable criminal aliens from
fleeing prior to or during their removal proceedings, thus increasing the chance
that, if ordered removed, the aliens will be successfully removed.” (emphasis
added)), with Salerno, 481 U.S. at 749 (“The government’s interest in preventing
crime by arrestees is both legitimate and compelling.” (emphasis added)).
341. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 752; see also Chelgren, supra note 197, at 1491 (“In
upholding pretrial detention, the Court also pointed to the procedural rights
afforded to the arrestee; namely, the Bail Reform Act required an adversarial
hearing regarding the arrestee’s dangerousness and placed strict time limits on
pretrial detention.”).
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determine whether § 1226(c) provides non-citizens with sufficient
due process.342
B. United States v. Salerno
In Salerno, the leading case on pretrial preventative
detention, the Court considered the constitutionality of the Bail
Reform Act.343 The Bail Reform Act authorized pretrial detention
of individuals charged with committing crimes in certain
categories.344 Congress passed the Bail Reform Act to address
“the alarming problem of crimes committed by persons on
release.”345 Accordingly, the Bail Reform Act sought to prevent
“individuals charged with certain crimes”346 from fleeing or
posing a danger to others while released on bail.347
342. See Chelgren, supra note 197, at 1492 (“Given the ubiquitous nature of
Salerno-type protections in other preventive detention schemes, it is striking
that virtually no protections attach to immigration detention.”); id. at 1516
(“Given that due process rights do apply to immigrants, and given that the
government does not have unlimited plenary power, the procedural protections
identified in Salerno and its progeny should apply in the context of immigration
detention.”).
343. 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2012).
344. See John B. Howard, Jr., Note, The Trial of Pretrial Dangerousness:
Preventive Detention After United States v. Salerno, 75 VA. L. REV. 639, 649
(1989)
The Act sets out four categories of offenses in which the government
may move for detention on the grounds of a defendant’s flight risk or
dangerousness: crimes of violence; offenses for which the maximum
sentence is life imprisonment or death; certain major drug offenses
carrying a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more; and
felonies committed after the accused has been convicted of two or
more prior federal or state offenses of the above types.
345. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 742 (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 3 (1983)).
346. Gilman, supra note 242, at 285.
347. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742 (1987) (“By providing
for sweeping changes in both the way federal courts consider bail applications
and the circumstances under which bail is granted, Congress hoped to ‘give the
courts adequate authority to make release decisions that give appropriate
recognition to the danger a person may pose to others if released.’” (quoting S.
REP. NO. 98-225, at 3 (1983))); see also id. (stating that the Act sanctions pretrial
preventative detention where “no condition or combination of conditions will
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of
any other person and the community, he shall order the detention of the person
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In reviewing a Fifth Amendment challenge to the Bail
Reform Act, the Salerno Court emphasized the statute’s
“extensive procedural safeguards.”348 First, and most importantly
for our discussion, the Bail Reform Act did not require pretrial
preventative detention. Rather, the Court noted that “[i]n a
full-blown adversary hearing, the Government must convince a
neutral decisionmaker by clear and convincing evidence that no
conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the
community or any person.”349 Additionally, while the Bail Reform
Act itself contained no time limit on pretrial detention, the Court
found that “pretrial detention [under the Act] is limited by the
stringent time limitations of the Speedy Trial Act.”350 Ultimately,
the Salerno Court upheld the Bail Reform Act, providing a useful
canvas for the types of procedural safeguards that a statute
authorizing preventive detention should possess to survive a
Fifth Amendment challenge.351
C. Comparing § 1226(c) Under Demore to the Bail Reform Act
A comparison of the Bail Reform Act and § 1226(c) under
Demore reveals several notable distinctions. First, as mentioned
above, the Bail Reform Act requires individualized
determinations as to the necessity of pretrial preventative
prior to trial” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e))).
348. See id. at 752 (“We think these extensive safeguards suffice to repel a
facial challenge.”); id. at 742 (“Section 3142(f) provides the arrestee with a
number of procedural safeguards.”).
349. Id.
350. Id. at 747. But see id. at 747 n.4 (“We intimate no view as to the point
at which detention in a particular case might become excessively prolonged, and
therefore punitive, in relation to Congress’ regulatory goal.”).
351. See Taylor, supra note 41, at 363
Acknowledging that the statute presented serious constitutional
issues, the Court nonetheless found that due process was satisfied
because of several protections embedded in the “no bail” statute.
Pretrial detention without bond was subject to stringent time
limitations. In addition, the statute provided substantive criteria to
limit its application to “the most serious of crimes,” and careful
procedures, built around a bond hearing before a judicial officer, to
protect criminal defendants against erroneous decisions.
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detention.352 In contrast, § 1226(c) mandates detention pending
removal proceedings with no individualized inquiry into the
necessity of such detention.353 Additionally, unlike the Bail
Reform Act, which is buttressed by the Speedy Trial Act,
§ 1226(c) under Demore provides no limitation as to the amount
of time a non-citizen can remain in custody.354
In upholding the Bail Reform Act, the Salerno Court stated
that the Act’s “extensive safeguards suffice to repel a facial
challenge.”355 As evidenced above, § 1226(c) under Demore lacks
the safeguards found in the Bail Reform Act.356 Accordingly, a
Court revisiting Demore should find that § 1226(c) under Demore
fails to provide sufficient due process compared to the Bail
Reform Act. The question then turns to whether the circuit
courts’ added safeguards provide non-citizens with sufficient due
process compared to the Bail Reform Act.
D. Comparing § 1226(c) in the Circuit Courts to the
Bail Reform Act
352. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750 (“In a full-blown adversary hearing, the
Government must convince a neutral decisionmaker by clear and convincing
evidence that no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the
community or any person.”).
353. See Silva, supra note 73, at 254 (“Section 1226(c) does not entitle the
noncitizen to any process weighing the traditional bail factors, including his risk
of flight and ties to the community.”).
354. See Medina, supra note 23, at 700 (“The statutory provisions
concerning removal and mandatory detention do not specify the period of time
in which removal must be determined nor do they provide a specific limit to the
period of time within which an alien placed in removal proceedings must be
detained.”).
355. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987).
356. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 41, at 364 (“The detention scheme [at issue
in Demore], which mandates pre-hearing detention for virtually all non-citizen
offenders without any hearing to assess flight risk or dangerousness,
indisputably does not meet the criteria of the Salerno line of cases.”); Chelgren,
supra note 197, at 1491 (“In nonimmigration contexts, the Supreme Court
continues to uphold the use of preventive detention when Salerno-type
protections are present; however, when these protections are absent, the Court
holds that preventive detention is unconstitutional.”); Medina, supra note 23, at
737 (stating that Demore “is Salerno without the Salerno process, and it is the
distinction between citizens and non-citizens that appears to allow the
government to dispense with process”).
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The federal circuit courts, acknowledging that a
straightforward application of § 1226(c) would pose a Fifth
Amendment problem, unanimously reject Demore as precedent.357
Instead, the circuits on both sides of the split opt to “read Demore
narrowly while more readily embracing the Zadvydas approach
[of constitutional avoidance].”358
To address § 1226(c)’s failure to provide a time limit on
mandatory detention, the circuits on both sides of the split
applied the constitutional avoidance doctrine, reading § 1226(c) to
include an implicit limit “on the amount of time that an
individual can be detained without a bail hearing.”359 However,
unlike the Bail Reform Act, the circuits on both sides of the split
still interpret § 1226(c) to authorize mandatory detention for all
covered individuals, albeit with an implicit time limit on such
detention read into the statute.360 In enacting both § 1226(c) and
the Bail Reform Act, Congress expressed a belief that, in certain
circumstances, detaining individuals not yet deemed guilty or
deportable was nevertheless necessary to achieve a desired
objective. However, the Bail Reform Act requires that the
Government prove, in an adversary hearing, that detaining an
individual prior to trial would actually achieve the desired
governmental interest.361 In denying arrestees that initial
hearing to challenge the necessity of their pre-removal detention,

357. See supra note 251 and accompanying text (providing examples of
circuit courts’ explanations for declining to follow Demore).
358. Taylor, supra note 41, at 366.
359. Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 614 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Anello,
supra note 40, at 363 (stating that “circuit courts have avoided a constitutional
problem with the mandatory detention statute by construing its ambiguous
language to impose temporal limits on mandatory detention”).
360. See, e.g., Lora, 804 F.3d at 616 (“[W]e hold that, in order to avoid the
constitutional concerns raised by indefinite detention, an immigrant detained
pursuant to section 1226(c) must be afforded a bail hearing before an
immigration judge within six months of his or her detention.”); Diop v.
ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 231 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Applying this principle to
1226(c) we conclude that the statute implicitly authorizes detention for a
reasonable amount of time . . . .”). See supra Part V for a discussion of each
circuits’ interpretation of § 1226(c).
361. Supra notes 348–349 and accompanying text.
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the circuits’ approaches lack a critical procedural safeguard
contained in the Bail Reform Act.362
Additionally, while reading an implicit time limit on
detention addressed the issue of indeterminate mandatory
detention, § 1226(c) under both sides of the split still authorizes
potentially
lengthy
mandatory
detention.
Under
the
individualized review of reasonableness approach, a non-citizen’s
only chance for release is to file a habeas petition challenging
detention as unreasonable and hope that a district court
agrees.363 Further, provided a non-citizen detained under
§ 1226(c) has the means to file such a petition, as the First
Circuit observed in Reid, individualized determinations tend to
produce “wildly inconsistent” results.364 Therefore, regardless of
how unreasonable detention may appear, timely release in the
First, Third, and Sixth Circuits is no sure thing.
To the bright-line, six-month approach, as Lora’s story
demonstrates, six months of detention can turn someone’s life
upside down. Lora’s 2013 detention lasted only five and a half
months, but during that time he lost his job, his son, and his
emotional wellbeing.365 Lora and his loved ones suffered greatly
as a result of his 2013 detention, despite the fact that the
Government agreed at his bond hearing that he “was not
dangerous and posed no risk of flight.”366 Critically, Lora and his
loved ones would find themselves in the exact same predicament
under the Second and Ninth Circuits’ six-month approach.
362. See Gilman, supra note 242, at 286 (“[I]n Salerno, the Supreme Court
emphasized that pretrial detention decisions must be made on an individualized
basis and that the government bears the burden of proving the need for
detention ‘by clear and convincing evidence.’” (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750–
51)).
363. See, e.g., Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486, 495 (1st Cir. 2016) (“Under this
approach, every detainee must file a habeas petition challenging detention, and
the district courts must then adjudicate the petition to determine whether the
individual's detention has crossed the ‘reasonableness’ threshold, thus entitling
him to a bail hearing.” (quoting Lora, 804 F.3d at 614)); Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d
263, 273 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The reasonableness of the length of detention is
subject to review by federal courts in habeas proceedings, as stated by
Zadvydas.”).
364. Reid, 819 F.3d at 497.
365. See supra Part I for more of Alexander Lora’s story.
366. Lora, 804 F.3d at 605.
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Applying the constitutional avoidance doctrine to § 1226(c),
the circuits on both sides of the split read an implicit protection
against indeterminate mandatory detention into the statute.367
However, both of the circuits’ approaches continue to sanction
mandatory detention of resident non-citizens with no
individualized inquiry into the necessity of such detention.368
Consequently, the circuits’ approaches reflect the notion that
some due process for non-citizens is better than none. However,
Supreme Court precedent provides that non-citizens within the
United States are entitled to all, not some, of the due process
rights set forth in the Fifth Amendment.369 For the foregoing
reasons, choosing a side in the current circuit split is not an
appropriate resolution. Rather, for the sake of consistency with
due process jurisprudence, and for the sake of non-citizens like
Lora, the Supreme Court should step in and revisit Demore.
E. The Road to Resolution
On June 20, 2016, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Rodriguez v. Robbins, the Ninth Circuit case involved in the
current split.370 This case provides the Court with a prime
opportunity to revisit Demore and the constitutionality of
§ 1226(c). As argued above, the Court should conclude that
§ 1226(c) under Demore fails to provide sufficient due process
compared to the Bail Reform Act. Additionally, the Court should
find that the circuits’ implicit time limits on detention fail to fully
resolve the disconnect between § 1226(c) and the safeguards
contained in the Bail Reform Act. Because neither Demore’s nor
the circuits’ interpretations of § 1226(c) provide sufficient due
process when compared to the Bail Reform Act, the Court should
find that § 1226(c) has a Fifth Amendment problem. If the Court
367. Supra note 359 and accompanying text.
368. Supra note 360 and accompanying text.
369. See supra note 329 and accompanying text (listing Supreme Court
precedent delineating the due process rights of non-citizens).
370. Jennings v. Rodriguez, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/jennings-v-rodriguez/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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deems § 1226(c) unconstitutional, then Congress should amend
the statute to include the sort of procedural safeguards found in
the Bail Reform Act.371 Such a scenario would resolve the current
split, as the amended § 1226(c) would presumably contain
sufficient due process for non-citizen arrestees. Therefore, the
statute’s Fifth Amendment problem that created the present
circuit split would no longer exist.
Regarding the practice of overturning precedent, the
Supreme Court generally adheres to the doctrine of stare
decisis.372 However, the Court regularly acknowledges that the
doctrine “is not an inexorable command.”373 Rather, whether the
doctrine “shall be followed or departed from is a question entirely
with the discretion of the court.”374 Accordingly, the doctrine of
stare decisis is not determinative if the Court wishes to overrule
Demore.
VII. Conclusion
Lora’s story serves as a sobering reminder that § 1226(c) does
not apply only to non-citizens who illegally entered the country
weeks or months before detention. The statute applies to all
non-citizens, including Lora, who entered the United States
legally at the age of seven and lived in Brooklyn ever since.375 The
Court, and the country, should not be satisfied with the circuits’
interpretations of § 1226(c), as both approaches continue to deny

371. See supra Part VI.B for a description of the procedural safeguards
identified in Salerno.
372. See Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468,
478–79 (1987) (“The rule of law depends in large part on adherence to the
doctrine of stare decisis.”).
373. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991); see also Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944) (“[W]hen convinced of former error, this
Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent.”).
374. See Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 212 (1910) (“The rule of stare
decisis, though one tending to consistency and uniformity of decision, is not
inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from is a question entirely
within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a
question once decided.”).
375. Id. at 606.
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non-citizens, like Lora, the same due process as citizens receive
under the Bail Reform Act.
This Note proposes that the Supreme Court revisit its
anomalous Demore decision. In doing so, the Court should
overturn Demore and strike down § 1226(c) as unconstitutional.
Such an outcome would resolve the current circuit split and
remove the inconsistent application of § 1226(c) in the circuits.
Additionally, such a result would provide a benefit to United
States citizens because the costs of detaining non-citizens
pending removal proceedings would decrease if mandatory
detention were not required for all. Finally, and most
importantly, such a ruling would ensure that non-citizens, like
Alexander Lora, may never have to suffer unreasonably and
unnecessarily.

